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Tax Treaty Abuse and the Principal Purpose Test
Part II
David G. Duff*

Abstract
The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting or Multilateral Instrument (MLI) has been described as
“an historical turning point in the area of international taxation” which introduces a
third layer of tax rules for the taxation of cross-border transactions in addition to
domestic tax law and bilateral tax treaties. Of the many provisions of the MLI, the
most important are the preamble text in Article 6(1) and the so-called principal
purpose test (PPT) in Article 7(1), both of which have been adopted by all
signatories to the MLI in order to satisfy the OECD’s minimum standard on tax treaty
abuse under BEPS Action 6. This two-part article considers the structure and
potential application of the PPT in the context of pre-BEPS responses to perceived
tax treaty abuses, the OECD’s work on BEPS Action 6, and other provisions of the
MLI including the preamble text in Article 6(1). The first part, in the previous issue of
the Journal, reviewed pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax treaty abuses, providing
necessary background and context for understanding BEPS Action 6, the MLI and the
PPT. The second part, in this issue of the Journal, examines the PPT in light of this
background and in the context of BEPS Action 6 and other provisions of the MLI,
considering its relationship to other anti-avoidance doctrines, principles and rules,
the various elements that comprise its basic structure, the kinds of transactions or
arrangements to which it may be expected to apply, and the consequences of its
application.

Introduction
The first part of this article examined pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax
treaty abuses, reviewing domestic and treaty-based responses to tax treaty shopping
* Professor and Director Tax LLM Program, Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. This
article expands upon the subject of the 2018 IFA Travelling Lecture on “The Multilateral Instrument
and Canada’s Tax Treaties”. I am indebted to the Canadian Branch of the International Fiscal
Association for inviting me to deliver the IFA Travelling Lecture, and to Ian Bradley and Ken
Buttenham for encouraging me to prepare a paper for the Journal, for their patience awaiting its
delivery, and for comments on earlier drafts.
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and other perceived treaty abuses in order to provide background for understanding
BEPS Action 6, MLI provisions aimed at preventing tax treaty abuses, and the
principal purpose test (PPT) in particular.1 The second part of this article examines
the PPT in light of this background and in the context of BEPS Action 6 and other
provisions of the MLI, considering its relationship to other anti-avoidance doctrines,
principles and rules, the various elements that comprise its basic structure, the kinds
of transactions or arrangements to which it may be expected to apply, and the
consequences of its application.
Part II. BEPS Action 6, the MLI and the Principal Purpose Test
As the first part of this article explained, the OECD and its member states
relied on various approaches to discourage tax treaty shopping and other perceived
tax treaty abuses prior to BEPS Action 6 and the MLI, including domestic antiavoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance rules, the concept of an
implicit anti-abuse principle, the beneficial ownership requirement, and specific
anti-avoidance rules in domestic law and tax treaties. In practice, however, these
approaches have been inconsistently adopted and applied. As well, the 2014
revisions to the OECD Commentaries confirm that the beneficial owner concept
should be narrowly interpreted and does not address all forms of tax treaty
shopping.2

David G. Duff, “Tax Treaty Shopping and the Principal Purpose Test – Part 1” (2018), 66:3 Can. Tax J.
1-57.
2 Paragraph 12.6 of the commentary on article 10 of the OECD model convention; paragraph 10.4 of
the commentary on article 11 of the OECD model convention; and paragraph 4.5 of the commentary
on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
1
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For these reasons, it is perhaps not surprising that the OECD’s Action Plan on
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting identified treaty abuse as “one of the most
important sources of BEPS concerns” and that BEPS Action 6 was specifically
mandated to “develop model treaty provisions and recommendations regarding the
design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances” and to “clarify that tax treaties are not intended to be used to
generate double non-taxation.”3 Before examining the PPT in detail, it is useful to
review the main recommendations of BEPS Action 6 and the incorporation of these
recommendations into the 2017 OECD model convention and provisions of the MLI.
A.

BEPS Action 6 and the MLI
Although the Final Report of BEPS Action 6 devotes some attention to

domestic anti-abuse rules and their relationship with tax treaties, 4 most of the
Report addresses treaty provisions to prevent tax treaty shopping and other treaty
abuses,5 and revisions to the title and preamble of tax treaties to clarify that tax
treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation.6 Incorporated
into the 2017 OECD model convention and various provisions of the MLI, these
provisions and revisions are intended to both strengthen treaty-based responses to

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting, (Paris: OECD, 2013) at 18 and 19 (https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf). BEPS
Action 6 was also mandated to “identify tax policy considerations that, in general, countries should
consider before deciding to enter into a tax treaty with another country.”
4 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, BEPS Action 6:
2015 Final Report, (Paris: OECD, 2015) [hereafter Final Report on BEPS Action 6] at paras. 53-67,
(www.oecd.org/tax/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstancesaction-6-2015-final-report-9789264241695-en.htm).
5 Ibid. paras.17-52.
6 Ibid. paras. 68-74.
3
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perceived tax treaty abuses and to promote increased consistency in these responses
through minimum standards which signatories to the MLI must adopt.
1.

Tax Treaty Shopping
Beginning with tax treaty shopping, the Final Report of BEPS Action 6

recommends a “three-pronged approach” comprising the following elements:
•

a “clear statement” in tax treaties that “the Contracting States, when entering
into a treaty, wish to prevent tax avoidance and, in particular, intend to avoid
creating opportunities for treaty shopping”;

•

inclusion in the OECD model convention of a specific limitation-on-benefits
(LOB) provision based on the LOB provisions in tax treaties with the United
States; and

•

inclusion in the OECD Model of “a more general anti-abuse rule based on the
principal purposes of transactions or arrangements”.7
The first of these “prongs” underlies revisions to both the title and the

preamble of the OECD model convention. Unlike the title of the 1963 and 1977 OECD
model conventions, which referred only to a convention “for the avoidance of double
taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital”, the title of the 2017 OECD
model convention refers to a convention “for the elimination of double taxation with
respect to taxes on income and on capital and the prevention of tax evasion and
avoidance.” As well, unlike many tax treaties which refer only to a desire to conclude
a convention “for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal

7

Ibid. para. 19.
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evasion with respect to taxes on income and on capital,” the preamble to the 2017
OECD model conventions states that the contracting states:
Desir[e] … to further develop their economic relationship and to enhance their cooperation in tax matters, [and]
Intend … to conclude a Convention for the elimination of double taxation with respect
to taxes on income and on capital without creating opportunities for non-taxation or
reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treatyshopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this Convention for the
indirect benefit of residents of third states).

According to the Final Report of BEPS Action 6, these revisions build upon
earlier statements in the 1977 and 2003 commentaries to the OECD model
convention,8 “provide the clarification required by Action 6,”9 and “will be relevant
to the interpretation and application of provisions” of tax treaties that include this
language.10 According to the commentary on these revisions:
The changes made expressly recognise that the purposes of the Convention are not
limited to the elimination of double taxation and that the Contracting States do not
intend the provisions of the Convention to create opportunities for non-taxation or
reduced taxation through tax evasion and avoidance. Given the particular base erosion
and profit shifting concerns arising from treaty-shopping arrangements, it was also
decided to refer explicitly to such arrangements as one example of tax avoidance that
should not result from tax treaties, it being understood that this was only one example
of tax avoidance that the Contracting States intend to prevent.11

The second element of the OECD’s “three-pronged approach” to tax-treaty
shopping is reflected in the framework for detailed LOB provisions in articles 29(1)Ibid. paras. 70-71. According to paragraph 7 of the 1977 commentary on article 1 of the OECD model
convention, tax treaties “should not … help tax avoidance or evasion.” According to paragraph 7 of the
2003 commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention, it is “a purpose of tax conventions to
prevent tax avoidance and evasion.” As explained in the first part of this article, although it is
reasonable to conclude that tax treaties are not intended to facilitate tax avoidance, it is less clear
whether they are intended to prevent tax avoidance, though it is arguable that provisions for the
exchange of information and assistance in the collection of taxes help to prevent tax avoidance as well
as tax evasion. Although the amended title of the OECD model convention declares that the
convention is “for the” prevention of tax evasion and tax avoidance as well as the elimination of
double taxation, the amended preamble language refers to an intention to eliminate double taxation
“without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance”.
9 Ibid. para. 72.
10 Ibid. para. 73.
11 Paragraph 16.1 of the commentary on the introduction to the 2017 OECD model convention.
8
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(7) of the 2017 OECD model convention. Similar in structure to the LOB provisions in
the 2016 U.S. model convention,12 these provisions limit otherwise available treaty
benefits to qualified persons,13 “headquarters” companies,14 income that emanates
from or is incidental to the active conduct of a trade or business carried on by a
resident of a contracting state who is not a qualified person,15 income paid to an
entity that is not a qualified person if a stipulated percentage of the entity is owned
directly or indirectly by equivalent beneficiaries,16 and treaty benefits granted by the
competent authority of the source state.17 Like the LOB provisions in the U.S. model
convention, these provisions are designed to limit treaty benefits to residents of
contracting states with substantive economic connections to that state and
circumstances where entitlement to treaty benefits does not result from abusive tax
treaty shopping.18 As a result, as the Final Report of BEPS Action 6 explains, these
specific anti-avoidance rules target “treaty shopping situations that can be identified
on the basis of criteria based on the legal nature, ownership in, and general activities
of, certain entities.”19
While the “objective criteria” of these LOB provisions provide “more
certainty” than a general anti-abuse provision like the PPT, the Report continues,
they do not address “other forms of treaty abuses” nor all forms of tax-treaty

United States, Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention , February
17, 2016 (www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-US%20Model2016.pdf). For a brief summary of these provisions, see the first part of this article.
13 Articles 29(1) and (2) of the OECD model convention.
14 Article 29(5) of the OECD model convention.
15 Article 29(3) of the OECD model convention
16 Article 29(4) of the OECD model convention.
17 Article 29(6) of the OECD model convention.
18 See the discussion of these provisions in the first part of this article.
19 OECD, Final Report on BEPS Action 6, supra note 4 at para. 20.
12
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shopping such as conduit arrangements “through which a resident of a Contracting
State that would otherwise qualify for treaty benefits is used as an intermediary by
persons who are not entitled to these benefits.” 20 For these reasons, the third
“prong” of the OECD’s recommended approach to tax treaty shopping includes a
more general anti-abuse provision in the form of a PPT that “incorporates the
principles” contained in the commentary to article 1 of the OECD model convention,
according to which:
… the benefits of a tax treaty should not be available where one of the principal

purposes of arrangements or transactions is to secure a benefit under a tax treaty and
obtaining that benefit in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and
purpose of the relevant provisions of the tax treaty.21

This general anti-abuse provision is contained in article 29(9) of the 2017 OECD
model convention.
Although recommending this “three-pronged approach” to tax treaty
shopping, the Final Report of BEPS Action 6 acknowledges that states might have
legitimate reasons to depart from this combined approach – for example, where
domestic anti-abuse rules or anti-avoidance doctrines make a general anti-abuse
rule unnecessary, or administrative capabilities make it difficult to apply detailed
LOB provisions. 22 For these reasons, the Report accepts “a certain degree of
flexibility” in the approaches that different states may adopt, provided that they

Ibid.
Ibid. at para. 19, referring to the “guiding principle” in paragraph 9.5 of the commentary on article 1
of the 2003 commentary on the OECD model convention. This “guiding principle” now appears in
paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2017 OECD model convention.
22 Ibid. paras. 6 and 21.
20
21
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“effectively address … treaty abuses along the lines of this report.”23 In the end,
therefore, the Report concludes:
At a minimum, countries should agree to include in their tax treaties an express
statement that their common intention is to eliminate double taxation without
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or
avoidance, including through treaty shopping arrangements … [and] implement that
common intention through either the combined approach …, , the inclusion of the PPT
rule, or the inclusion of the LOB rule supplemented by a mechanism (such as a treaty
rule that might take the form of a PPT rule restricted to conduit arrangements or
domestic anti-abuse rules or judicial doctrines that would achieve a similar result)
that would deal with conduit arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.24

The various elements of the combined approach as well as these “minimum
standards” on treaty abuse are reflected in provisions of the MLI.
The MLI itself is a product of BEPS Action 15, which was mandated to devise a
legal instrument to modify existing bilateral tax treaties “in order to swiftly
implement the tax treaty measures developed in the course of the OECD-G20 BEPS
Project.”25 Consistent with the recommended approach to tax treaty shopping in the
Final Report in BEPS Action 6, the MLI includes preamble language corresponding to
the amended preamble text of the 2017 OECD model convention, 26 simplified
limitation-on-benefits (SLOB) provisions similar to articles 29(1)-(7) of the 2017
OECD model convention,27 and a general anti-abuse provision like the PPT in article
29(9) of the OECD model convention.28 Consistent with the “minimum standards” in
this Report, signatories to the MLI are required to adopt the amended preamble text

Ibid. paras. 6 and 22.
Ibid. para. 22.
25 OECD, Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties, BEPS Action 15: 2015
Final Report, (Paris: OECD, 2015) at 11, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/developing-amultilateral-instrument-to-modify-bilateral-tax-treaties-9789264219250-en.htm.
26 Articles 6(1) and (3) of the MLI. The MLI does not include a provision that would modify the title of
CTAs to correspond to the amended title of the 2017 OECD model convention.
27 Articles 7(8)-(13) of the MLI. Unlike the OECD model convention, however, the SLOB does not
include a provision extending treaty benefits to headquarters companies.
28 Article 7(1) of the MLI.
23
24

8

expressing an intention “to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes
covered by this agreement without creating opportunities for non-taxation or
reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treatyshopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this Convention for
the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions)” where such language does not
already exist in a CTA.29 They are also required to implement this intention by
adopting the PPT alone where a CTA does not already contain a similar general antiabuse provision,30 by adopting the PPT and the SLOB, 31 or by indicating that they
intend to adopt a combination of a detailed LOB provision and either rules to
address conduit financing structures or a PPT.32
See article 6(2) of the MLI, providing that the preamble text in article 6(1) “shall be included in a
Covered Tax Agreement in place of or in the absence of preamble language of a Covered Tax
Agreement referring to an intent to eliminate double taxation, whether or not that language also
refers to the intent not to create opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation,” and article 6(4)
of the MLI which allows parties to the MLI to reserve the right for article 6(1) not to apply to CTAs
“that already contain preamble language describing the intent of the Contracting Jurisdictions to
eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation,
whether that language is limited to cases of tax evasion or avoidance (including through treatyshopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in the Covered Tax Agreement for the
indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions) or applies more broadly.” In contrast, article 6(3)
provides parties to the MLI the right to choose to include preamble text expressing the desire of the
contracting jurisdictions “to further develop their economic relationship and to enhance their cooperation in tax matters.”
30 See article 7(15)(b) of the MLI, which permits signatories to reserve the right for article 7(1) not to
apply to CTAs that “already contain provisions that deny all of the benefits that would otherwise be
provided under the Covered Tax Agreement where the principal purpose or one of the principal
purposes of any arrangement or transaction, or of any person concerned with an arrangement or
transaction, was to obtain those benefits.”
31 See article 7(6) of the MLI, which allows parties to the MLI to choose to apply the SLOB. Although
this provision states that the SLOB will apply to a CTA only where all parties to the CTA have chosen
to apply the provisions, article 7(7)(a) provides that the SLOB may apply asymmetrically where
contracting jurisdictions that do not choose to apply these provisions agree to such application by
contracting jurisdictions that choose to apply the SLOB. Where parties choose to apply the SLOB,
article 7(14) provides that it “shall apply in place of or in the absence of” provisions of a CTA that limit
treaty benefits “only to a resident that qualifies for such benefits by meeting one or more categorical
tests.” According to article 7(15)(c), however, parties which choose to apply the SLOB may reserve
the right for the provisions not to apply to CTAs that already contain provisions limiting treaty
benefits only to residents that qualify by meeting one or more categorical tests.
32 See article 7(15)(a) of the MLI, which permits parties to the MLI to reserve the right for article 7(1)
not to apply to its CTAs “on the basis that it intends to adopt a combination of a detailed limitation on
29
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Of eighty-four jurisdictions that had signed the MLI as of 18 September 2018,
all adopted the preamble text in article 6(1) and the PPT in article 7(1), fifty-four
(not including Canada) adopted the additional preamble text in article 6(3), and
thirteen have chosen to apply the SLOB in addition to the PPT. 33 Although no
signatory reserved the right for the PPT not to apply on the basis that it intends to
adopt detailed LOB provisions and either rules to address conduit financing
structures or a PPT through bilateral negotiations, eight jurisdictions including
Canada have stated that they accept the PPT alone “as an interim measure” but
“intend … where possible to adopt a limitation on benefits provision, in addition to
or in replacement of [the PPT], through bilateral negotiations.”34
2.

Other Treaty Abuses
In addition to its recommendations and minimum standards to address tax

treaty shopping, the Final Report of BEPS Action 6 also contains recommendations
and proposed treaty provisions to address other situations where persons enter into
transactions or arrangements to satisfy conditions of particular treaty provisions “in
circumstances where it would be inappropriate to grant the relevant treaty

benefits provision and either rules to address conduit financing structures or a principal purpose test,
thereby meeting the minimum standard for preventing treaty abuse under the OECD/G20 BEPS
package.” In this case, the provision continues, “the Contracting Jurisdictions shall endeavour to reach
a mutually satisfactory solution which meets the minimum standard.” See also article 7(17)(a), which
permits a party to the MLI to declare that it accepts the PPT alone “as an interim measure” but
“intends where possible to adopt a limitation on benefits provision, in addition to or in replacement of
[the PPT], through bilateral negotiations.”
33 Figures compiled by the author from positions of signatories available at Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, “Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention To Implement
Tax Treaty Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Status as of 18 September 2018”
(http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf).
34 Ibid.
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benefits.” 35 Although observing that the PPT “will be useful in addressing such
situations,”36 the Report rightly notes that that “targeted specific treaty anti-abuse
rules

generally

provide

greater

certainty

for

both

taxpayers

and

tax

administrations.”37 For this reason, it provides “examples of situations with respect
to which specific treaty anti-abuse rules may be helpful and proposals for changes
intended to address some of these situations.”38
In order to prevent tax-motivated transactions or arrangements intended to
obtain the reduced withholding tax rate on dividends paid to a parent company, for
example, the Report proposes that the reduced rate should be available only where
the minimum ownership threshold is satisfied “throughout a 365 day period that
includes the day of the payment of the dividend.39 Incorporated into article 10(2)(a)
of the 2017 OECD model convention, this minimum shareholding period provides
greater certainty than the application of limited purpose tests in many tax treaties or
the application of a general anti-abuse principle.40 In order to prevent tax-motivated
transactions or arrangements intended to avoid a substituted property rule for
capital gains by diluting the proportion of an entity’s value attributable to
immovable property in a state, the Report also proposes that the value threshold for
Final Report on BEPS Action 6, supra note 4, para. 27.
Ibid.
37 Ibid. As a result, according to paragraph 62 of the commentary on the 2017 OECD model
convention, the existence of a PPT “does not mean that there is no need for the inclusion, in tax
conventions, of specific provisions aimed at preventing particular forms of tax avoidance.” On the
contrary, it explains: ”Where specific avoidance techniques have been identified or where the use of
such techniques is especially problematic, it will often be useful to add to the Convention provisions
that focus directly on the relevant avoidance strategy.”
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. at para. 36. For the purpose of computing this period, the proposed provision explicitly
excludes “changes of ownership that would result directly from a corporate reorganization, such as a
merger or divisive reorganization, of the company that holds the shares or that pays the dividend.”
40 See the discussion of pre-BEPS approaches to these transactions or arrangements in the first part of
this article.
35
36
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the substituted property rule should apply “at any time during the 365 days
preceding the alienation” of the shares or comparable interests subject to the rule.41
As with the minimum shareholding period for dividends, the time period for this
value threshold was added to the 2017 OECD model convention.42
In addition to these specific treaty anti-abuse rules, the Final Report of BEPS
Action 6 also discusses anti-abuse provisions to prevent the tax-motivated splittingup of contracts to avoid permanent establishment status for a building site or
construction or installation project that lasts more than twelve months,43 “hiring-out
of labour” arrangements designed to convert employment income that would
otherwise be subject to tax in which the employment is exercised into employment
income that is exempt from source state taxation,44 and transactions designed to
convert dividends into capital gains.45 It also proposes an alternative tie-breaker rule
for dual-resident entities that replaces the place of effective management test with
competent authority determination,46 and a specific anti-abuse provision for lowtaxed income attributable to a permanent establishment in a third state that is
exempt from tax in the residence state.47 article 4(3) of the 2017 OECD model
convention replaces the place of effective management test for dual-resident entities
with competent authority determination, and article 29(8) adds the anti-abuse rule
for low-taxed income attributable to a permanent establishment in a third state.

Final Report on BEPS Action 6, supra note 4, paras. 43-44.
Article 13(4) of the 2017 OECD model convention.
43 Final Report on BEPS Action 6, supra note 4, para. 29.
44 Ibid. para. 31.
45 Ibid. para. 32.
46 Ibid. paras 45-48.
47 Ibid. paras 49-52.
41
42
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As with the BEPS proposals on measures to prevent tax treaty shopping,
provisions to prevent other treaty abuses were also included in the MLI, which
contains anti-avoidance rules for dividends and capital gains in articles 8(1) and
9(1), an anti-avoidance rule for low-taxed income attributable to a permanent
establishments in third jurisdictions in article 10(1), an anti-avoidance rule for
splitting-up of contracts in article 14(1), and the alternative tie-breaker rule for
dual-resident entities in article 4(1). Unlike the proposals on measures to prevent
tax treaty shopping, however, none of these provisions constitute minimum
standards that signatories to the MLI must adopt, and none will modify a CTA unless
all parties to the CTA choose to apply the provision and notify the OECD to this
effect.48 Of the eighty-four jurisdictions that had signed the MLI as of 18 September
2018, thirty-seven opted to apply the rule for dividends in article 8(1), forty-eight
opted to apply the rule for capital gains in article 9(1), twenty-three opted to apply
the rule for low-taxed permanent establishments in article 10(1), twenty-eight opted
to apply the rule for splitting-up of contracts in article 14(1), and twenty-nine opted
to apply the alternative tie-breaker rule for dual-resident entities in article 4(1).49
Although Canada did not choose to apply any of these provisions when it signed the
MLI on 7 June 2017,50 it has subsequently indicated that it will adopt the anti-

See Articles 8(4), 9(8), 10(6), 14(4) and 4(4) of the MLI.
Figures compiled by the author from positions of signatories available at OECD, “Signatories and
Parties to the Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Measures to Prevent Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting: Status as of 18 September 2018” supra note 33.
50 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, “Status of List of Reservations and
Notifications at the Time of Signature” 30 May 2017 (www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-positioncanada.pdf).
48
49
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avoidance rules for dividends and capital gains in articles 8(1) and 9(1) and the
alternative tie-breaker rule for dual-resident entities in article 4(1).51
B.

The Principal Purpose Test
Of the many provisions of the MLI, the most important are the preamble text

in article 6(1) and the PPT in article 7(1), which have been adopted by all signatories
to the Convention in order to implement the minimum standard on treaty abuse.
While the preamble text states that the CTA is intended to eliminate double taxation
“without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax
evasion or avoidance (including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at
obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of
third jurisdictions),”52 the PPT reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the
Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or
capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and
circumstances, that obtaining the benefit was one of the principal purposes of any
arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless
it is established that granting that benefit in those circumstances would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax
Agreement.53

Based on a “guiding principle” in the commentary on the OECD model
convention, 54 and similar in structure to Canada’s general anti-avoidance rule

Department of Finance Canada, “Backgrounder: The Next Step in the Fight Against Aggressive
International Tax Avoidance” 21 June 2018 (https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentfinance/news/2018/05/backgrounder-the-next-step-in-the-fight-against-aggressive-internationaltax-avoidance.html).
52 Article 6(1) of the MLI. This language also appears in the preamble to the 2017 OECD model
convention.
53 Article 7(1) of the MLI. This provision also appears as article 29(9) of the 2017 OECD model
convention.
54 See Paragraph 169 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, referring to the
“guiding principle” in para. 61 of the 2017 OECD model convention, according to which “the benefits
of a double taxation convention should not be available where a main purpose for entering into
certain transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that
51
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(GAAR),55 this provision introduces a general anti-avoidance or anti-abuse rule to
CTAs. According to the commentary on the 2017 OECD model convention, the PPT is
intended to “allow States to address cases of improper use of the Convention even if
their domestic law does not allow then to do so” and to “confirm” the application of
a general anti-abuse principle “for States whose domestic law already allows them
to address such cases.”56 The remainder of this article examines this provision in
detail, considering its relationship to other anti-avoidance doctrines, principles and
rules, and the various elements that comprise its basic structure, in order to
determine the kinds of transactions or arrangements to which it may be expected to
apply and the consequences of its application.
1.

Relationship to Other Anti-Avoidance Doctrines, Principles and Rules
Beginning with the relationship between the PPT and other anti-avoidance

doctrine, principles and rules, three questions may be posed. First, how does the PPT
interact with domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory anti-avoidance rules?
Second, does the PPT displace implicit general anti-abuse principles like the “guiding
principle” in the commentary on the OECD model convention? And third, how should
the PPT relate to specific treaty anti-abuse rules that are included (or not included)
in a CTA? The following sections address each of these questions.

more favourable treatment in the circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions.”
55 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-1, s. 245 (as amended) [hereafter ITA]. Like the PPT, this provision
applies to deny a tax benefit where three requirements are satisfied: (1) a transaction (or series of
transactions of which the transaction is a part) would otherwise result directly or indirect in a tax
benefit; (2) the transaction may not reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged
primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit; and (3) it may reasonably be
considered that the transaction would otherwise result in a misuse of provisions of the ITA or other
relevant enactments or an abuse having regard to those provisions read as a whole.
56 Paragraph 169 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
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(1)

Relationship to Domestic Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Statutory AntiAvoidance Rules
Since domestic law generally determines the characterization of transactions

or arrangements to which tax treaties apply, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
PPT will not displace domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory antiavoidance rules that apply to transactions or arrangements that might otherwise be
subject to the PPT. Where tax-motivated emigration is subject to a domestic exit tax,
for example, reliance on the PPT is likely unnecessary. Similarly, where tax
avoidance transactions or arrangements are re-characterized under domestic antiavoidance doctrines or statutory general anti-avoidance rules, the PPT is
presumably redundant. For these reasons, the commentary on the 2017 OECD model
convention affirms the “important role” of domestic anti-abuse rules and judicial
doctrines in “preventing treaty benefits from being granted in inappropriate
circumstances” irrespective of the PPT.57
To the extent that treaty provisions prevail over conflicting provisions of
domestic law, however, it may be argued that domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and
statutory anti- avoidance rules are inapplicable if they result in taxation that is not in
accordance with the provisions of a tax treaty.58 Although the commentary explains
that these conflicts will be avoided in many cases59 – for example, where the treaty
specifically allows the application of specific domestic anti-abuse rules,60 where the

Paragraph 67 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
Paragraph 70 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
59 Paragraph 71 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
60 Paragraph 72 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
57
58
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treaty specifically depends on the application of domestic law, 61 or where the
application of a treaty provision is denied under judicial doctrines or principles of
treaty interpretation62 – it also suggests that the PPT could apply to deny a benefit
under a treaty provision that would otherwise prevail over a domestic antiavoidance rule.63 It also concludes that general statutory anti-avoidance rules do not
conflict with tax treaties to the extent that they conform to the “guiding principle”
and the PPT, since “the relevant domestic general anti-abuse rule will apply in the
same circumstances in which the benefits of the Convention would be denied” under
the “guiding principle” or the PPT.64
For these reasons, it is clear that the PPT does not preclude reliance on
domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory anti-avoidance rules, 65 which
should presumably be applied prior to the PPT since these doctrines and provisions
generally determine the characterization of transactions or arrangements to which
tax treaties apply. Nor does the application of a domestic anti-avoidance doctrine or
provision preclude application of the PPT where the anti-avoidance doctrine or
provision is subject to a treaty provision that would otherwise prevail over the
domestic doctrine or provision. As a result, it follows that transactions or
Paragraph 73 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention, referring for example,
to the determination of a person’s residence, the determination of immovable property, and the
determination of when income from corporate rights may be treated as a dividend.
62 Paragraph 75 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention, providing an example
of a transaction characterized as a sham under domestic law. See also paragraph 78 of the
commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention, referring to judicial anti-avoidance doctrines
“such as substance over form, economic substance, sham, business purpose, step-transaction, abuse
of law and fraus legis.”
63 Paragraph 74 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention, providing as an
example a domestic anti-avoidance rule taxing capital gains of former residents that might otherwise
be subject to the treaty exemption in article 13(5) of the OECD model convention.
64 Paragraph 72 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
65 See, e.g., Luc De Broe and Joris Luts, “BEPS Action 6; Tax Treaty Abuse” (2015), 43:2 Intertax 135 at
139.
61

17

arrangements may be assessed under domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and
statutory anti-avoidance rules as well as the PPT.
(2)

Relationship to Implicit Anti-Abuse Principle
According to the commentary on the OECD model convention, the “guiding

principle” that a benefit under a tax treaty should not be available where “one of the
principal purposes of arrangements or transactions is to secure a more favourable
tax position” and “obtaining that more favourable treatment in these circumstances
would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions” of the treaty,
“applies independently from the provisions of [the PPT], which merely confirm it.”66
On this basis, it follows that the concept of an implicit anti-abuse principle reflected
in the “guiding principle” is not displaced by the PPT, but may operate alongside as
an independent approach to address tax treaty shopping and other treaty abuses.
Notwithstanding this statement, however, a strong argument can be made as
a matter of treaty interpretation that an explicit anti-abuse provision like the PPT
should prevail over an implicit anti-abuse principle like the “guiding principle”.67
Indeed, subsequent statements in the commentary suggest that the “guiding
principle” is best understood as an alternative to the PPT, which “applies
independently” of the PPT only in the interpretation of tax treaties that do not
include a PPT.68 For this reason, as Danon concludes, the “status and function of the

Paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
See, e.g., De Broe and Luts, supra note 65 at 140-141.
68 See, e.g., paragraphs 74 and 77 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention,
arguing that domestic anti-abuse rules generally do not conflict with tax treaties since benefits
otherwise available under a treaty may be denied under the PPT, “or, in the case of a treaty that does
not include that paragraph“ under the “guiding principle” [emphasis added].
66
67
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guiding principle will obviously be less important” following the introduction of the
PPT into the text of the 2017 OECD model convention and the MLI.69
(3)

Relationship to Specific Treaty Anti-Abuse Rules
More challenging, and likely more important, than the relationship between

the PPT and domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory anti-avoidance rules or
the relationship between the PPT and the “guiding principle” is the relationship
between the PPT and specific treaty anti-abuse rules that may be included (or not
included) in a CTA. As the parenthetical words in the previous sentence suggest, this
issue involves two separate inquiries, concerning the relationship between the PPT
and specific treaty anti-abuse rules that are included in a particular CTA, and the
relationship between the PPT and specific treaty anti-abuse rules contained in the
MLI or other tax conventions, including model tax conventions, but not adopted in
that CTA.
(a)

Relationship to Specific Treaty Anti-Abuse Rules in a CTA
Where a CTA includes a specific anti-abuse rule or SAAR, the relationship

between the PPT and this rule can become an issue in two kinds of cases: where the
SAAR applies to a particular transaction or arrangement, or where a transaction or
arrangement is not subject to a SAAR because it satisfies the formal requirements of
the rule.
In the first case, where the SAAR applies to a transaction or arrangement, the
interpretive principle that a specific provision prevails over a more general
Robert J. Danon, “Treaty Abuse in the Post-BEPS World: Analysis of the Policy Shift and Impact of
the Principal Purpose Test for MNE Groups” (January 2018), 72 Bulletin for International Taxation 31
at 38.

69

19

provision (lex specialis derogat legi generali) suggests that the PPT should have no
application. In the domestic context, for example, courts typically regard GAARs as
provisions “of last resort” that apply only to deny tax benefits that are not otherwise
denied under anti-avoidance doctrines or specific anti-avoidance rules,70 concluding
on this basis that a GAAR cannot be applied to impose additional tax consequences
beyond those resulting from a specific anti-avoidance rule.71 For this reason, some
commentators have argued that the PPT should generally not apply to abusive
transactions or arrangements that “could be tackled” under both the PPT and a
treaty-based SAAR.72
Since the PPT explicitly applies “[n]otwithstanding any provisions of a
Covered Tax Agreement,” however, it follows that the words of this provision
override the lex specialis principle that would otherwise apply.73 As a result, the
proper interpretive question is not simply whether a treaty-based SAAR prevails
over the PPT, but whether a transaction or arrangement that is subject to a SAAR
may still result in a “benefit under a CTA” to which the PPT could apply. Indeed, the
commentary to the 2017 OECD model convention supports this interpretation,
stating that a benefit that is denied under an LOB provision or a SAAR for low-taxed
permanent establishments in third jurisdictions “is not a ‘benefit under the
Convention’ that [the PPT] would also deny.”74 If application of a SAAR were to result

Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada, 2005 SCC 56, [2005] 2 SCR 601, [2005] 5 C.T.C. 215, 2005
D.T.C. 5523, at para. 21 [hereafter Canada Trustco].
71 XCo Investments Ltd. v. Canada, [2006] 1 C.T.C. 2220, 2005 D.T.C. 1731 (T.C.C.), aff’d [2007] 2 C.T.C.
243, 2007 D.T.C. 5146 (F.C.A.), at para. 40, stating that the GAAR cannot be used to “top up” a remedy
under a specific anti-avoidance rule.
72 See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 52.
73 See, e.g., De Broe and Luts, supra note 65 at 146.
74 Paragraph 171 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
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in a treaty benefit, however, judicial decisions in context of domestic GAARs suggest
that a general anti-abuse rule could be applied to deny this benefit if it would
contradict the object and purpose of the SAAR.75 In practice, however, it is difficult
to imagine a case in which a SAAR could be used to produce a benefit under a CTA.
In the second case, where a transaction or arrangement is not subject to a
treaty-based SAAR because it satisfies the formal requirements of the rule, different
considerations apply. Although the lex specialis principle might suggest that the PPT
should not apply in this circumstance, this conclusion depends on whether the SAAR
fully addresses the particular transaction or arrangement at issue.76 For example,
since the beneficial owner requirement addresses only “some forms of tax avoidance
(i.e. those involving the interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the
dividend to someone else),” the commentary on the OECD model convention is clear
that the PPT can apply to transactions or arrangements even if they satisfy this
requirement.77 Likewise, since LOB provisions do not address all forms of tax treaty
shopping, it is clear that the PPT can apply to transactions or arrangements such as
conduit financing arrangements that satisfy one or more LOB provisions.78

See, e.g., Lipson v. Canada, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 314, 2009 D.T.C. 5015 (S.C.C.) [hereafter Lipson] at para.
42, in which a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada applied the GAAR to a series of transactions
that were subject to a specific attribution rule on the basis that “a specific anti-avoidance rule” had
been “used to facilitate abusive tax avoidance.”
76 See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 53, arguing that application of the PPT in this circumstance
depends on whether the specific anti-abuse rule “covers the factual situation at issue.”
77 Paragraph 12.5 of the commentary on article 10 of the OECD model convention, stating that the fact
that the recipient of a dividend is its beneficial owner “does not mean … that the limitation of tax”
under article 10(2) “must automatically be granted” and that the PPT and general anti-abuse
principles “will apply to prevent abuses, including treaty-shopping situations where the recipient is
the beneficial owner of the dividends.” Virtually identical language appears in paragraph 10.3 of the
commentary on article 11 and paragraph 4.4 of the commentary on article 12.
78 This is clear from the Final Report on BEPS Action 6, supra note 4 at para. 19, recommending both a
specific anti-abuse rule based on LOB provisions and a PPT “to address other forms of treaty abuse,
including treaty shopping situations that would not be covered by the LOB rule” [emphasis added].
75
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For the same reason, the PPT could also apply to transactions or
arrangements that satisfy the formal requirements of other treaty provisions or
circumvent the application of other SAARs. Although these provisions often include
quantitative limitations that arguably create safe harbours for transactions or
arrangements that either satisfy or avoid these limitations,79 any conclusion that the
lex specialibus principle excludes the PPT in these circumstances also depends on
whether these provisions fully address the transactions or arrangements at issue.
Where a treaty provision that reduces the withholding tax rate on dividends paid to
a parent company with a minimum shareholding does not include a minimum
withholding period, for example, it is not clear that the lex specialibus principle
prevents the PPT from applying to a transaction in which a company with a
shareholding less than the minimum increases its shareholding shortly before the
payment of a dividend in order to obtain the reduced withholding tax rate. 80
Likewise, where a substituted property rule for capital gains on the alienation of
shares or comparable interests deriving their value principally from immovable
property does not include a time period preceding the alienation during which this
value threshold may apply, it is arguable that the lex specialibus principle does not
See also paragraph 172 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, stating that
“the fact that a person is entitled to benefits” under a specific LOB provision “does not mean that
these benefits cannot be denied” under the PPT, and the example in paragraph 173 of the
commentary of a publicly-traded bank that enters into conduit financing arrangement, which the
commentary concludes would be subject to the PPT even though it would be entitled to benefits
under a LOB provision as a “qualified person”.
79 See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 53, arguing that “it would be unacceptable to first include a SAAR
in a tax treaty that specifically circumscribes the taxpayer behaviour which the treaty partners
consider abusive on the basis of objectively verifiable (often quantitative, safe harbor) parameters,
only to subsequently apply the PPT rule to extend the legal consequences provided therein to other
situations beyond the scope of that SAAR.”
80 Before 2017, paragraph 17 of the commentary on article 10 of the OECD model convention
characterized this kind of transaction as an “abuse” of the provision to which the reduced withholding
tax rate “should not be available”.
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prevent the PPT from applying to a transaction carried out shortly before alienation
of shares or other interests that dilutes the proportion of an entity’s value
attributable to immovable property in order to circumvent the rule.
Moreover, since the text of the PPT explicitly states that it applies
“[n]otwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement,” it appears as
thought the PPT could apply to a transaction or arrangement one of the principal
purposes of which is to obtain a benefit under a CTA even if the transaction or
arrangement satisfies or circumvents the formal requirements of other treaty
provisions including SAARs. In this circumstance, however, the relevant interpretive
question is not whether a transaction or arrangement results in a benefit under a
CTA (since this will be the case where the transaction or arrangement satisfies or
circumvents the formal requirements of the relevant treaty provisions), but whether
granting the benefit in this circumstance contradicts the object and purpose of these
provisions.81 While the satisfaction or avoidance of a quantitative limitation in a
specific treaty provision creates a strong presumption that granting the resulting
benefit is consistent with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions,82 this
determination is ultimately a matter of interpretation having regard to the relevant
provisions as well as extrinsic materials such as explanatory memoranda and
commentaries that may shed light on the intentions of the contracting jurisdictions.
Since a key objective of specific treaty anti-abuse rules is “to provide greater
This aspect of the PPT is examined in further detail below at infra notes 198-273 and accompanying
text.
82 See, e.g., Michael Lang, “BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties” (19 May
2014) Tax Notes International 655 at 658, observing that “it is hard to understand why [the PPT]
should in some cases reduce the percentage” threshold of a substituted property rule that applies to
shares or comparable interests the value of which is principally attributable to immovable property in
a state “to 50 percent or less.”
81
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certainty for both taxpayers and tax administrations,” 83 however, it seems
reasonable to conclude that benefits resulting from transactions or arrangements
that comply with quantitative limitations in these provisions are generally consistent
with their object and purpose.
(b)

Relevance of Specific Treaty Anti-Abuse Rules not Included in a CTA
Where a particular CTA is not modified by a SAAR that is contained in the MLI

or does not otherwise include a SAAR that is contained in the MLI or another tax
convention, including a model tax convention, a different question arises as to
whether the PPT can apply to transactions or arrangements that would otherwise be
subject to this SAAR. Although it might reasonably be argued that the absence of this
rule in the contest of a particular CTA evidences an intention on the part of the
contracting jurisdictions to grant treaty benefits resulting from transactions or
arrangements that would otherwise be subject to the rule,84 it may also be argued
that the contracting jurisdictions intend to rely on the PPT to challenge these
transactions or arrangements without adopting the detailed limitations of the
SAAR.85 As with the relationship between the PPT and SAARs that either modify or
are included in a particular CTA, this question is ultimately a matter of interpretation
having regard to the relevant provisions as well as extrinsic materials such as
Final Report on BEPS Action 6, supra note 4 at para. 27.
For a useful example, see Knights of Columbus v. The Queen, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 2163, 2008 D.T.C. 3648
(T.C.C.) [hereafter Knights of Columbus] in which the Tax Court of Canada considered the absence of a
specific insurance provision like article 5(6) of the United Nations model tax convention in the
Canada-U.S. Treaty to be a relevant consideration in concluding that the taxpayer had not carried on
business in Canada through a permanent establishment. See United Nations, Model Double Taxation
Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, (New York: United Nations, 2011), article
5(6) [herein referred to as the United Nations model tax convention]
85 See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 43, concluding that “[w]here a state has reserved the right not to
apply” the specific anti-abuse rules in articles 8(1) and 9(1) of the MLI, “the PPT would thus apply by
default to those situations.”
83
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explanatory memoranda and commentaries that may shed light on the intentions of
the contracting jurisdictions.
Beginning with LOB provisions, the fact that the minimum standards on
treaty abuse may be satisfied by a PPT alone or by a combination of PPT and LOB
provisions, suggests that the PPT could apply to benefits that might otherwise be
denied under specific LOB provisions that do not modify and are not otherwise
included in a particular CTA.86 This conclusion is also supported by the fact that the
minimum standards require signatories to the MLI to adopt the amended preamble
language declaring that the CTA is not intended to create “opportunities for nontaxation or reduced taxation through tax avoidance or evasion … including through
treaty shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement
for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions.”87 As a result, although the
commentary on the OECD model convention does not specifically address this issue,
the amended preamble text and the context of BEPS Action 6 strongly suggest that
the PPT may apply to tax treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements that would
be subject to an LOB provision if it modified or were otherwise included in a CTA.
Likewise with “dividend transfer transactions” that are specifically addressed
by the minimum shareholding period for the reduced withholding tax rate on
dividends in article 8(1) of the MLI, the text of the MLI and the context of this SAAR
suggest that the PPT could apply to transactions or arrangements that would be

As explained at supra text accompanying notes 33-34, only thirteen signatories to the MLI have
chosen to apply the SLOB as well as the PPT, and only eight have indicated that they intend to adopt
LOB provisions in addition to or in replacement of the PPT through bilateral negotiations. As a result,
most CTAs subject to the MLI will not include LOB provisions.
87 Article 6(1) of the MLI.
86
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subject to this rule if it modified or were otherwise included in a particular CTA.
Since the MLI provides that the PPT applies “in place of” limited purpose tests in
CTAs,

88

which could be used to challenge rule-shopping transactions or

arrangements undertaken to obtain a reduced withholding tax rate on dividends
paid by a subsidiary to a parent company,89 it is difficult to see why the replacement
of these provisions by the PPT should preclude the application of this more general
anti-abuse provision to these transactions or arrangements in the absence of a
minimum shareholding period for the reduced withholding tax rate on dividends. As
well, since the pre-2017 commentary on the OECD model convention characterized
dividend transfer transactions as an “abuse” of article 10(2)(a) to which the reduced
withholding tax rate “should not be available”,90 and the PPT was introduced to
“confirm” the application of a general anti-abuse principle to tax treaties,91 it would
be odd to conclude that the PPT should not apply to these transactions or
arrangements because they might also be addressed by a SAAR that does not apply
to or is not otherwise included in a particular CTA. Indeed, although the commentary
on the OECD model convention does not explicitly state that the PPT can apply to
deny benefits that would otherwise be denied under article 8(1) of the MLI, this
conclusion is suggested by an example that considers the possible application of the
PPT to a transaction that could be subject to this specific anti-abuse rule.92 As a

Article 7(2) of the MLI.
See the discussion of “Other Treaty Abuses” in the first part of this article.
90 Paragraph 17 of the commentary on article 10 of the 2003 OECD model convention.
91 Paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention, and paragraph 169 of
the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
92 Example E in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, which
is discussed at infra, text accompanying notes 262-265. See also paragraph 16 of the commentary on
article 10 of the OECD model convention, which notes the addition of a minimum shareholding period
88
89
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result, although at least one commentator has argued that the PPT should not apply
to deny a treaty benefit resulting from a dividend transfer transaction if the dividend
article does not include a minimum shareholding period,93 it seems more reasonable
to conclude that the PPT could apply in this circumstance, absent some indication
that the contracting jurisdictions intended that the PPT should not apply in such
circumstances to CTAs without a minimum shareholding period.
A similar argument supports the conclusion that the PPT could apply to
contract-splitting transactions or arrangements in order to avoid permanent
establishment status for a building site or construction or installation project lasting
more than twelve months, even if the CTA does is not modified by or not otherwise
include a SAAR like article 14(1) of the MLI that aggregates the time periods of
separate contracts involving connected activities carried on by closely related
enterprises.94 These transactions or arrangements were considered abusive in the
pre-2017 commentary on the OECD model convention,95 and are also addressed in
the 2017 commentary, which suggests that “these abuses could … be addressed”
through the PPT.96 As a result, as one commentator observes, “having reserved not

to article 10(2)(a) of the OECD model convention, but concludes that the PPT could apply to “other
abusive arrangements aimed at obtaining the benefits” of the reduced withholding tax rate under this
provision.
93 Reinout Kok, “The principal purpose test in tax treaties under BEPS 6” (2016), 44:5 Intertax 406 at
411.
94 See the discussion of this provision at supra text accompanying notes 43 and 48-49 under the
heading “Other Treaty Abuses”.
95 Paragraph 18 of the commentary on article 5 of the 2003 OECD model convention.
96 Paragraph 52 of the commentary on article 5 of the OECD model convention. See also example J in
paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
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to apply this specific SAAR to their CTAs, countries may … tackle this fact pattern on
the basis of the PPT rule.”97
Indeed, since the commentary on abusive contract-splitting also states that
“[s]ome States may nevertheless wish to deal expressly with such abuses” 98 it
appears as though specific anti-abuse rules in the MLI could, like LOB provisions, be
regarded as complements to the PPT, which do not preclude application of the PPT
to transactions or arrangements that would be addressed by these specific antiabuse rules if they were included in a CTA. On this basis, the PPT could also apply to
transactions or arrangements that dilute the proportion of an entity’s value
attributable to immovable property in order to avoid a substituted property rule or
“hiring-out of labour” arrangements in order to avoid source taxation of employment
income, even if the CTA does not include a specific anti-abuse provision that would
otherwise address these transactions or arrangements. Although the commentary is
silent on the possible application of the PPT to transactions or arrangements that
avoid a substituted property rule that does not include a time period test like the one
in article 9(1) of the MLI,99 it explicitly affirms the application of the PPT to hiringout of labour arrangements even if a treaty does not include a specific anti-abuse
rule to address these arrangements.100

Danon, supra note 69 at 44.
Paragraph 52 of the commentary on article 5 of the OECD model convention.
99 See the discussion of this provision at supra text accompanying notes 41-42 and 48-49 under the
heading “Other Treaty Abuses”.
100 Paragraph 8.8 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model Convention, stating that a state
“may deny the application of the exception” in article 15(2) of the OECD model convention “in abusive
cases” – “as recognized by” the PPT.
97
98
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2.

Basic Structure of the PPT
Like the guiding principle and the Canadian GAAR, the application of the PPT

turns on three tests. According to the first of these tests, which may be called the
“result test”, a transaction or arrangement must have “resulted directly or indirectly”
in a benefit under a CTA. According to the second test, which is a “purpose test”, it
must be “reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and
circumstances, that obtaining the benefit was one of the principal purposes” of the
transaction or arrangement. Finally, the third test is an “object and purpose test”
which provides that the PPT does not apply if it is established that granting the
benefit in the circumstances would be “in accordance with the object and purpose of
the relevant provisions” of the CTA. Where the first two tests are satisfied and the
third is not, the effect of the PPT is to deny the benefit that would otherwise be
granted in respect of an item of income or capital under the CTA. The following
sections consider each of these tests, as well as the consequences of its application,
considering similarities to and differences from the guiding principle and the
Canadian GAAR.
(1)

Result Test
Although the PPT is based on the guiding principle, which refers to “the

benefits of a double tax convention”, the language and structure of the result test in
the PPT is actually much closer to the Canadian GAAR, which denies a “tax benefit”
that would otherwise “result, directly or indirectly” from an avoidance transaction or
a series of transactions that includes an avoidance transaction. In order to fully
understand this test, it is necessary to consider each of its elements: (1) the meaning
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of a “benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement”, (2) the meaning of an “arrangement
or transaction”, and (3) the requirement that the arrangement or transaction has
“resulted directly or indirectly” in the benefit.
(a)

Benefit under a CTA
It is curious that neither the MLI nor the 2017 OECD model convention define

the term “benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement”. In contrast, the concept of a “tax
benefit” for the purposes of the Canadian GAAR is explicitly defined as:
a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable under this Act or
an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under this Act, and includes a
reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount that would be payable under
this Act but for a tax treaty or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under
this Act as a result of a tax treaty.101

Since article 1(2) of the MLI states that an undefined term shall, unless the
context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the
relevant CTA, and tax treaties generally provide that terms that are not defined in
the treaty shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that they
have under domestic law at the time, it might be argued that a domestic definition
such as this one should apply for the purposes of the PPT. Because the PPT refers to
a benefit “under a Covered Tax Agreement”, however, it seems clear that the concept
has an autonomous international fiscal meaning and should not be defined according
to the meaning of a tax benefit for the purposes of domestic law. This interpretation
also supports one of the purposes of the PPT, to foster greater uniformity among
contracting jurisdictions in their responses to tax treaty abuse.
Consistent with this interpretation, the commentary to the 2017 OECD model
convention states that the concept of a “benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement”
101

ITA, s. 245(1).
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contemplates treaty limitations on source taxation under the distributive rules of a
CTA, as well as treaty benefits attributable to an elimination of double taxation
article, including benefits from a tax sparing provision.102 It also states that a benefit
under a CTA could also include protection against non-discrimination under
provisions comparable to article 24 of the OECD model convention, though it is
difficult to imagine how this benefit could be obtained abusively.103 In contrast, the
commentary does not identify other benefits under a CTA, such as the availability of
dispute resolution mechanisms under the mutual agreement procedure or
arbitration, though at least one commentator has suggested that these mechanisms
are not themselves “benefits” but processes through which benefits may be
obtained.104 Nor does the commentary address unilateral benefits under domestic
law such as foreign tax credits or participation exemptions, though it seems
reasonable to conclude that these benefits are not benefits “under a Covered Tax
Agreement” to which the PPT could apply, even if these benefits are contemplated by
an elimination of double taxation article in a CTA.105
Although the commentary on the OECD model convention provides useful
guidance on the general concept of a “benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement”, the
characterization of a benefit in the context of a specific transaction or arrangement
necessarily depends on a standard or benchmark against which the existence of a
“benefit” is measured. Since the PPT refers to a benefit “under a Covered Tax
Agreement”, an obvious interpretation of this benchmark would be the tax
Paragraph 175 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
See, e.g., Lang, supra note 82 at 657; and De Broe and Luts, supra note 65 at 144.
104 Lang, supra note 82 at 657.
105 See, e.g., De Broe and Luts, supra note 65 at 144; and Danon, supra note 69 at 43.
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consequences that would have resulted under the domestic law of a contracting
jurisdiction absent the CTA.106 Alternatively, as with the characterization of a tax
benefit for the purposes of the Canadian GAAR, the existence of a “benefit” under a
CTA could be determined by comparing the tax consequences resulting from the
specific transaction or arrangement at issue with the tax consequences that would
have resulted from an alternative transaction or arrangement that that “might
reasonably have been carried out but for the existence of the … benefit.”107
Because the PPT stipulates that “a benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement
shall not be granted” whenever the provision applies, the first interpretation could
have punitive consequences, since the PPT would deny the treaty benefit that would
otherwise result from the specific transaction or arrangement at issue without
recognizing benefits that would have resulted under the same CTA or another tax
treaty from an alternative transaction or arrangement that would otherwise have
been carried out.108 For this reason, absent any indication that the PPT is intended to
have this punitive effect, it might be argued that the second interpretation should be
preferred.
Textually, however, the meaning of “a benefit under a Covered Tax
Agreement” seems more compatible with the first interpretation than the second,
which instead contemplates an overall benefit “from” the CTA, not a specific benefit
See, e.g., Lang, supra note 82 at 657, stating that: “Obviously, what is meant is that the tax situation
would have to improve for the taxpayer as a result of the application of one or several treaty
provisions as compared with the domestic legislation ….” [emphasis added]
107 Copthorne Holdings v. Canada, 2011 SCC 63, [2011] 3 SCR 721, [2012] 2 C.T.C. 29, 2012 D.T.C. 5007
[Copthorne Holdings] at para. 35, citing D.G. Duff, et. al, Canadian Income Tax Law, 3d ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2009) at 187.
108 See the discussion at infra text accompanying notes 274-286 under the heading “Consequences of
Application”. As noted below, these punitive consequences may be relieved under a remedial benefits
provision in article 7(4) of the MLI.
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“under” the CTA. More significantly, perhaps, the MLI also contains a remedial
benefits rule authorizing the competent authority of the contracting jurisdiction that
would otherwise have granted a benefit under a CTA to:
… nevertheless treat that person as being entitled to this benefit, or to different
benefits with respect to a specific item of income or capital, if such competent
authority, upon request from that person and after consideration of the relevant
facts and circumstances, determines that such benefits would have been granted to
that person in the absence of the transaction or arrangement.109

Taking this provision into account, therefore, it seems more reasonable to conclude
that the existence of a benefit under a CTA should be determined by reference to the
tax consequences that would have resulted under the domestic law of a contracting
jurisdiction absent the CTA, not the tax consequence that would have resulted from
an alternative transaction or arrangement that would otherwise have been carried
out.110
On this basis, it also follows that the characterization of a benefit under a CTA
should be made without regard to tax consequences in the other contracting
jurisdiction, such as higher taxes in a residence state on account of reduced foreign
tax credits to offset lower taxes in a source state, even if these tax consequences are
governed by the CTA rather than domestic law. While these offsetting tax
consequences may affect a taxpayer’s overall tax burden in both contracting

Article 7(4) of the MLI. This provision is discussed later in this article under the heading
“Consequences of Application”. Although this remedial benefits rule was not added to the 2017 OECD
model convention, it appears in paragraph 184 of the commentary on the OECD model convention as
an optional provision that “States are free to include … in their bilateral treaties”.
110 For a similar conclusion addressing the consequences of the PPT’s application rather than the
concept of a benefit under a CTA, see André Báez Moreno, “GAARS and Treaties: From the Guiding
Principle to the Principal Purpose Test: What Have We Gained from BEPS Action 6?” (2017), 45
Intertax 432 at 442.
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jurisdictions,111 they do not affect the character of “a” benefit under a CTA, which
exists whenever the CTA reduces the domestic tax of a contracting jurisdiction
regardless of the impact that this tax reduction may have on taxation in the other
contracting jurisdiction.112 Although this means that the PPT could apply even if
reduced taxes in one contracting jurisdiction were fully offset by increased taxes in
the other contracting jurisdiction,113 this result is presumably consistent with the
object and purpose of the PPT, which is not only to prevent non-taxation or reduced
taxation from the abuse of tax treaties, but also to ensure that tax treaties apply “in
accordance with the purpose for which they were entered into”114 – namely, to
allocate taxing rights among contracting states in a fair and reasonable manner in
order to encourage cross-border economic activity by reducing or eliminating
economic double taxation.115 Where the denial of a treaty benefit in a source state
increases the tax that is paid to that state, the other state will generally be obliged to
eliminate double taxation by crediting this increased tax.116
(b)

Transaction or Arrangement
Like the concept of a benefit under a CTA, the concepts of a “transaction” or

an “arrangement” are also not defined in the MLI or the OECD model convention. In
See e.g., Lang, supra note 82 at 657, observing that it is difficult to identify a “benefit” where a
lower withholding tax burden in a source state is fully offset by higher taxation in the residence state
on account of a lower foreign tax credit.
112 For a similar conclusion, see Danon, supra note 69 at 43, concluding that the concept of a benefit
under a CTA “exclusively covers the reduction of the domestic taxation that the state applying the tax
treaty must accept”.
113 In this circumstance, on the other hand, it might be difficult to conclude that one of the principal
purposes of the transaction or arrangement was to obtain a benefit under the CTA.
114 Paragraph 174 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
115 See, e.g., Luc De Broe, International Tax Planning and the Prevention of Abuse, (Amsterdam: IBFD,
2008) at 344. See the discussion of the object and purpose of tax treaties at infra, text accompanying
notes 220-225.
116 This and other consequences of the PPT’s application are examined at infra, text accompanying
notes 274-286 under the heading “Consequences of Application”.
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contrast, the Canadian GAAR defines a “transaction” to include “an arrangement or
event”, and distinguishes a transaction from a “series of transactions” which is
defined to include “related transactions completed in contemplation of the series.”117
In the context of this definition, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that an
ordinary series of transactions contemplates “a number of transactions that are ‘preordained in order to produce a given result’ with ‘no practical likelihood that the
pre-planned events would not take place in the order ordained’’,118 and that the
statutory definition of the term extends this ordinary meaning to also include
transactions that are completed before or after an ordinary series “because of” or “in
relation to” the ordinary series and with knowledge of the ordinary series.119
As with the concept of a benefit under a CTA, since the MLI does not define
the meaning of a transaction or an arrangement, it is arguable that article 1(2) of the
MLI requires these terms to be given the meanings that they have under the relevant
CTA, in the absence of which these terms should be given the meanings that they
have under domestic law. Since the Canadian GAAR defines a “transaction” to include
an “arrangement” and distinguishes a “transaction” from a “series of transactions”,
this interpretation means that the PPT would, in the Canadian context, apply only to
benefits that result from a single transaction and not from a series of transactions.
While the resolution of this interpretive issue is not as clear as it is for the
concept of a “benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement”, the text and context of the
ITA, s. 248(10).
Canada Trustco, supra note 70 at para. 25, citing Craven v. White, [1989] A.C. 398 (H.L.) at 514, per
Lord Oliver.
119 Ibid. at para. 26. Although the conclusion that the extended meaning of a series of transactions can
include a subsequent related transaction has been criticized as a strained interpretation of the words
“in contemplation of”, the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed this interpretation in Copthorne
Holdings, supra note 107 at paras. 50-58.
117
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PPT suggest that the terms “transaction” or “arrangement” should also be given an
autonomous international fiscal meaning independent of domestic law. Although the
Canadian GAAR defines a “transaction” to include an “arrangement”, the ordinary
meaning of an “arrangement” is broad enough to contemplate a series of
transactions. More importantly, while the official French version of the ITA
translates “transaction” as “opération” which is defined to include “une convention,
un méchanism ou un événement”, the official French version of the MLI refers to
“une transaction” and “un montage” – the latter of which is also broad and clearly
contemplates a series of transactions. As well, since contracting jurisdictions
presumably intended the PPT to have a common meaning in all CTAs, it seems
reasonable that the words “transaction” or “arrangement” should be given a
meaning independent of domestic law.120
Not surprisingly, this interpretation is consistent with the commentary on the
2017 OECD model convention, which states that the terms transaction or
arrangement “should be interpreted broadly and include any agreement,
understanding, scheme, transaction or series of transactions, whether or not legally
enforceable.”

121

More specifically, the commentary continues, the words

“transaction” or “arrangement” include “the creation, assignment, acquisition or
transfer of the income itself, or of the property or right in respect of which the
income accrues” and “encompass arrangements concerning the establishment,

For a similar argument that undefined words in the PPT should have an autonomous
interpretation, see Blażej Kużniacki, “The Principal Purpose Test (PPT) in BEPS Action 6 and the MLI:
Exploring the Challenges arising from Its Legal Implementation and Practical Application” (2018), 10
World Tax J. 1 at 6-7.
121 Paragraph 177 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD Model Convention.
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acquisition or maintenance of a person who derives the income, including the
qualification of that person as a resident of one of the Contracting States, and include
steps that persons may take themselves in order to establish residence.”122 As a
result, as one commentator observes, the PPT could apply to abusive conduit
arrangements as well as abusive restructurings. 123 Indeed, examples in the
commentary on the 2017 OECD model convention suggest that the PPT could –
where other requirements of the PPT are satisfied – apply to conduit arrangements
such as those in Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen124 and Velcro Canada Inc. v. Canada,125
dividend transfer transactions like those in the Royal Dutch Oil Company case126 and
the Bank of Scotland case,127 as well as steps that are taken in order to change a
corporation’s residence for tax purposes as occurred in MIL Investments (SA) v. The
Queen128 and Yanko-Weiss Holdings (1996) Ltd. v. Holon Assessing Office.129

Ibid.
Danon, supra note 69 at 43.
124 [2008] 5 C.T.C. 2306, 2008 D.T.C. 3080 (T.C.C.), aff’d [2009] 3 C.T.C. 160, 2009 D.T.C. 5053 (F.C.A.)
[hereafter Prévost Car]. This case is summarized in the first part of this article.
125 [2012] 4 C.T.C. 2029, 2012 D.T.C. 1100 (T.C.C.) [hereafter Velcro]. This case is summarized in the
first part of this article.
126 BNB 1994/217[herein referred to as the Royal Dutch Oil Company case]. This case is discussed in
the first part of this article, and is the basis for example A in paragraph 182 of the commentary on
article 29 of the OECD model convention.
127 Conseil d’Etat, Case 283314 (29 December 2006) [herein referred to as the Bank of Scotland case].
This case is discussed in the first part of this article, and is the basis for example B in paragraph 182 of
the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
128 [2006] 5 C.T.C. 2552, 2006 D.T.C. 3301 (T.C.C.), aff’d [2007] 4 C.T.C. 235, 2007 D.T.C. 5437 (F.C.A.)
[hereafter MIL Investments]. This case is discussed in the first part of this article. See paragraph 180 of
the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, referring to a change of residence
shortly before the sale of property.
129 (2007) 10 ITLR 254 [hereafter [hereafter Yanko-Weiss Holdings]. This case is discussed in the first
part of this article. See paragraph 177 of the Commentary on article 29 of the OECD model
convention, referring specifically to “steps [that] are taken to ensure that meetings of the board of
directors of a company are held in a different country in order to claim that the company has changed
its residence.”
122
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(c)

Benefit Results Directly or Indirectly from the Transaction or
Arrangement
In order for a transaction or arrangement to “result” in a benefit under a CTA

there must be a connection or nexus between the transaction or arrangement and
the benefit under the CTA, such that the benefit may reasonably be considered to be
attributable to the transaction or arrangement. Although this nexus may be easily
established where a single transaction results directly in a benefit, it can be more
difficult to identify where the benefit results indirectly from another transaction or
arrangement, or where the benefit results from several transactions that may or may
not comprise an arrangement or series of transactions.
Beginning with indirect benefits, the use of the words “directly or indirectly”
in the PPT are intended to expand the nexus requirement, making it clear that the
provision applies not only to a benefit under a CTA that results directly from
transactions or arrangements one of the principal purposes of which is to obtain the
benefit, but also to benefits that result from other transactions or arrangements that
do not themselves result in a benefit under a CTA.130 As a result, the commentary
explains, where a company that has loaned funds to a taxpayer in a state with which
the company’s state of residence does not have a tax treaty transfers the loan to a
subsidiary that is resident in a state with which the borrower’s state of residence has
entered into a tax treaty in order to obtain benefits under this treaty, the PPT could
apply to deny the benefit of a reduced withholding tax rate on interest payments on
See paragraph 176 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, stating that the
phrase “that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit” is “deliberately broad” and “intended to
include situations where the person who claims the application of benefits under a tax treaty may do
so with respect to a transaction that is not the one that was undertaken for one of the principal
purposes of obtaining that treaty benefit.”
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the grounds that this benefit has resulted indirectly from a tax-motivated transfer of
the loan, notwithstanding that the interest payment is not itself tax-motivated.131
It is more difficult to determine when a number of transactions may be
regarded as a series of transactions or “arrangement” for the purposes of the PPT.
Although a narrow interpretation of a “series of transactions” might suggest that an
“arrangement” comprises only transactions that are “pre-ordained in order to
produce a given result” with “no practical likelihood that the pre-planned events
would not take place in the order ordained,’’ 132 a broader interpretation could
encompass all mutually interdependent transactions the legal effect of which would
be meaningless without the series, or all transactions which are undertaken in order
to obtain the particular benefit.133 Since the PPT uses the word “arrangement” rather
than the term “series of transactions” and domestic law in Canada deliberately
extends the narrow meaning of a series of transactions to include related
transactions completed in contemplation of a series, it seems reasonable to conclude
that the meaning of an “arrangement” in the PPT should be interpreted more broadly
than the narrow meaning of an ordinary series of transactions adopted in English
and Canadian law.
Even if the concept of an “arrangement” is broadly defined, however, there is
a limit to the transactions and events that may reasonably be included in this
concept. While it may be relatively easy to conclude that an acquisition of shares by a

Paragraph 176 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
Canada Trustco, supra note 70 at para. 25, citing Craven v. White, supra note 118.
133 For a useful discussion of these alternative interpretations of a “series of transactions”, see John
Tiley, “Series of Transactions” in 1988 Conference Report: Report of Proceedings of the Fortieth Tax
Conference, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988) 8:1 at 8.3-8.4.
131
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company shortly before the payment of a dividend by another company is part of an
arrangement the result of which is to obtain the benefit of a reduced withholding tax
rate on the dividend payment, this conclusion is difficult to sustain where the
acquisition occurs long before the payment of the dividend – particularly if the
acquisition is motivated by a non-tax purpose. Likewise, where assets are
contributed to a company shortly before a sale of its shares in order to dilute the
proportion of the company’s assets attributable to immovable property, it is
relatively easy to conclude that this transaction is part of an arrangement the result
of which is to obtain the benefit of a treaty exemption on capital gains from the
alienation of the shares. Where the assets are contributed long before the share sale,
on the other hand, it is difficult to regard this transaction as part of an arrangement
the result of which is obtain a treaty benefit – especially if the assets are contributed
to the company for a non-tax purpose.
In the absence of specific rules like the time period tests in articles 8(1) and
9(1) of the MLI,134 determining whether a transaction is part of an arrangement that
results in a benefit under a CTA is ultimately a matter of interpretation, having
regard to the relationship between the specific transaction and other transactions
and the purposes for which the transaction is undertaken. In this respect, therefore,
as with the characterization of a benefit under a CTA, the determination of whether a
transaction is part of an arrangement that results directly or indirectly in a benefit
under a CTA necessarily depends on the purposes of the transaction.

See the earlier discussion of these provisions at supra text accompanying notes 39-42 and 48-49
under the heading “Other Treaty Abuses”.
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(2)

Purpose Test
Like the guiding principle, which refers to “a main purpose” for entering into

a transaction or arrangement,135 and limited purpose tests in tax treaties which refer
to “the main purpose or one of the main purposes” of any person concerned with the
creation or assignment of property in respect of which an amount is paid,136 the PPT
applies where it is “reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and
circumstances,“ that obtaining a treaty benefit was “one of the principal purposes” of
a transaction or arrangement that resulted in a benefit under a CTA. As a result, the
purpose test in the PPT adopts a lower threshold than most domestic GAARs which
generally apply only where the sole or dominant purpose of a transaction or
arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit,137 and a lower threshold than the Canadian
GAAR which applies where a transaction is undertaken or arranged “primarily” to
obtain a tax benefit.138
Like the Canadian GAAR and unlike the guiding principle and limited purpose
tests, on the other hand, the PPT refers to the purposes of a transaction or
arrangement itself, rather than the purpose “for entering into” the transaction or
arrangement or the purpose “of persons concerned” with a transaction or
arrangement, suggesting a more objective analysis of the purposes of a transaction
or arrangement, beyond the subjective intentions of the parties to these transactions
Paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2017 OECD model convention
See, e.g., articles 10(7), 11(9) and 12(8) of the Canada-UK tax treaty. Convention Between Canada
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital
Gains, signed in London on September 8, 1978, and amended by Protocols signed on April 15, 1980,
October 16, 1985, May 7, 2003, and July 21, 2014 (herein referred to as “the Canada-UK tax treaty”).
137 Paulo Rosenblatt and Manuel Tron, “General Report” 2018 IFA Congress, Cahiers de droit fiscal
international, vol. 103 (Rotterdam: International Fiscal Association, 2018) 17 at 29-30.
138 ITA, s. 245(3).
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or arrangements. This objective analysis is reinforced by the use of the words
“reasonable to conclude” in the PPT, which do not appear in the guiding principle or
limited purpose tests in tax treaties, but are similar to the words “may reasonably be
considered” which appear in the Canadian GAAR.
Unlike the Canadian GAAR, however, which does not apply where a
transaction “may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged
primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit,” the PPT applies
where it is reasonable to conclude that one of the principal purposes of an
arrangement or transaction was to obtain a benefit under a CTA. As a result, while
the Canadian GAAR imposes an initial burden on taxpayers to provide a reasonable
explanation as to why the primary purpose of a transaction was not to obtain a tax
benefit which the revenue department must then refute, the PPT imposes an initial
burden on the revenue authority to provide a reasonable explanation as to why one
of the principal purposes of an arrangement or transaction was to obtain a benefit
under a CTA which the taxpayer must refute.
This section examines each of the elements of the purpose test in the PPT,
considering: (1) the concept of a purpose of a transaction or arrangement, (2) the
meaning of “one of the principal purposes” of a transaction or arrangement, and (3)
the effect of the words “reasonable to conclude” on the application of the purpose
test.
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(a)

Purpose of a Transaction or Arrangement
Unlike anti-avoidance provisions in early tax treaties which referred to the

intention of a taxpayer, 139 limited principal purposes tests which refer to the
purpose of persons concerned with the creation or assignment of rights,140 and the
“guiding principle” which refers to a purpose “for entering into certain transactions
or arrangements”,141 the PPT does not refer to the subjective intentions or purposes
of parties to a transaction or arrangement but to the purposes of a transaction or
arrangement itself. In this respect, the purpose test in the PPT is similar to the
purpose test in the Canadian GAAR, which refers to the purpose of a transaction,
rather than the purpose of the parties to a transaction.
Although it has been argued that reference to the purpose of a transaction
suggests a purely objective test irrespective of the subjective purposes of parties to a
transaction,142 it is difficult to imagine that a transaction or arrangement could have
transcendent purposes independent of the purposes of the parties to the transaction
or arrangement.143 On this basis, it follows that a purpose test based on the purposes
of a transaction or arrangement is not entirely objective, but may take into account
See. e.g., article XI(2) of the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty, which denied the reduced withholding tax
rate for dividends paid by a subsidiary to a parent company if “the competent authority” of the source
state was “satisfied that the corporate relationship between the two corporations has been arranged
or is maintained primarily with the intention of taking advantage of this paragraph.” Convention
Between Canada and the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Establishment of Rules of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance in the Case of Income Taxes, signed at
Washington, DC on March 4, 1942 (herein referred to as “the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty”).
140 See, e.g., articles 10(7), 11(9) and 12(8) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 136.
141 Paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2017 OECD model convention
142 Brian J. Arnold and James R. Wilson, “The General Anti-Avoidance Rule - Part 2” (1988), 34:5 Can.
Tax J. 1123 at 1157. See also Carlos Palao Taboada, “OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action 6:
The General Anti-Abuse Rule” (2015), 10 Bulletin for International Taxation 602 at 605, concluding
that the purpose of a transaction “is not a quality pertaining to the will of a party to the transaction,
but rather a legal attribute of the transaction itself.”
143 See David G. Duff, et. al. Canadian Income Tax Law, 6th ed. (Markham, LexisNexis, 2018) at 184, n.
64.
139
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the specific circumstances of the persons who are parties to the transaction or
arrangement.144 The commentary on the OECD model convention is consistent with
this conclusion, observing that is important to consider “the aims and objects of all
persons involved in putting [an] arrangement or transaction into place or being a
party to it.”145
In assessing the purposes of a transaction or arrangement, on the other hand,
courts consistently emphasize that they should not “be guided only by a taxpayer’s
statements, ex post facto or otherwise” but should instead look for “objective
manifestations of purpose.”146 In this respect, as the Supreme Court of Canada has
stated, “purpose is ultimately a question of fact, to be decided with due regard for all
of the circumstances.”147 The commentary on the OECD model convention adopts a
similar approach, stating that the purpose of an arrangement or transaction is “a
question of fact, which can only be answered by considering all circumstances
surrounding the arrangement or event on a case by case basis,”148 and that a person
cannot avoid application of the PPT “by merely asserting that the arrangement or
transaction was not undertaken or arranged to obtain the benefits” of a tax treaty.149
Where a transaction results in a tax benefit, moreover, at least one Canadian
tax case has held that the revenue authority may reasonably infer that a purpose of
the transaction was to obtain this tax benefit, so that the taxpayer must offer an
Ibid.
Paragraph 178 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention [emphasis added].
146 Symes v. Canada, [1994] 1 C.T.C. 40, 94 D.T.C. 6001 (S.C.C.), at para. 74. See also Groupe Honco Inc.
v. Canada, 2012 TCC 305 at para. 16 [hereafter Group Honco Inc.].
147 Symes, supra note 146 at para 74. For this reason, it is mistaken to conclude that the purpose test
in the PPT requires an assessment of “motives” which are “impossible to prove.” Lang, supra note 82
at 658.
148 Paragraph 178 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
149 Paragraph 179 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
144
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explanation that is “neither improbable nor unreasonable” to rebut this inference.150
Since a purpose test clearly differs from a result test, however, the fact that a
transaction results in a tax benefit is generally not itself sufficient to conclude that
one of its purposes was to obtain this benefit.151 The commentary on the OECD
model convention arrives at the same conclusion, emphasizing that:
It should not be lightly assumed … that obtaining a benefit under a tax treaty was
one of the principal purposes of an arrangement or transaction and merely
reviewing the effects of an arrangement will not usually enable a conclusion to be
drawn about its purposes.152

(b)

One of the Principal Purposes of a Transaction or Arrangement
Like limited purpose tests in tax treaties which apply where “the main

purpose or one of the main purposes” of any person concerned with the creation or
assignment of property in respect of which an amount is paid is to obtain a treaty
benefit,153 the PPT applies where it is reasonable to concluded that “one of the
principal purposes” of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain a benefit under a
CTA. Similar language appears in the general anti-abuse rule of the EU Anti-Tax
Avoidance Directive (ATAD),154 and identical words appear in the anti-abuse rule in

Placer Dome Inc. v. Canada, [1977] 1 C.T.C. 72, 96 D.T.C. 6562 (F.C.A.) at para 21 [hereafter Placer
Dome]. See also Groupe Honco Inc., supra note 146 at para. 18, concluding that it is reasonable to
consider “the inherent likelihood or probability of an event occurring” in assessing where one of the
main purposes of a transaction or series of transactions was to obtain a dividend.
151 Placer Dome, supra note 150 at para. 23, observing that “the term ‘result’ invites an objective
appreciation of the factual circumstances” and concluding that the use of the word “purpose” in one
context and “result” in another “requires that a different meaning be attributed to each.”
152 Paragraph 178 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
153 See, e.g., articles 10(7), 11(9) and 12(8) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 136.
154 Article 6(1) of EU Council Directive 2016/1164 (12 July 2016), providing that, for the purpose of
calculating corporate tax liability, member states “shall ignore an arrangement or a series of
arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of
obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the applicable tax law, are not genuine
having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances.”
150
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the EU Union Parent-Subsidiary Directive155 and the discretionary relief provisions
of the LOB rules in the MLI and the US model tax convention.156 In contrast to these
provisions, domestic GAARs generally apply only where the sole or dominant
purpose of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain a tax benefit, 157 and the
Canadian GAAR applies where a transaction is undertaken or arranged “primarily” to
obtain a tax benefit.158
For this reason, the PPT has been subject to considerable criticism, 159
including the objection that the provision violates principles of legal certainty and
proportionality under European law. 160 Although the argument that the PPT
contradicts EU law seems overblown given similar language in the ATAD and
identical language in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive,161 there is no doubt that the

EU Council Directive 2015/121 (27 January 2015), amending the EU Council Directive
2011/96/EU (30 November 2011), stipulating that member states “shall not grant the benefit of this
Directive to an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the
main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or
purpose of this Directive, are not genuine having regard to all the facts or circumstances.”
156 See article 7(12) of the MLI and article 22(6) of the US model tax convention, which authorize the
competent authority of state to grant treaty benefits to a resident of the other state either generally or
with respect to a specific item of income where, among other requirements, the resident
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the competent authority that “neither its establishment,
acquisition or maintenance, nor the conduct of its operations had as one of its principal purposes the
obtaining of benefits” under the relevant tax treaty. United States, Department of the Treasury, Unites
States Model Income Tax Convention, February 17, 2017 [herein referred to as the US model tax
convention].
157 Rosenblatt and Tron, supra note 137 at 29-30
158 ITA, s. 245(3).
159 See, e.g., Lang, supra note 82 at 659-60; De Broe and Luts, supra note 65 at 145; Kużniacki, supra
note 120 at 13-14; and Kok, supra note 93 at 408.
160 See, e.g., E.C.C.M. Kemmeren, “Where is EU Law in the OECD BEPS Discussion?” (2014), 23(4) EC
Tax Review 190; and Luc De Broe, “Tax Treaty and EU Aspects of the LOB and PPT provision proposed
by BEPS Action 6,” in Robert Danon, ed., Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Impact for European and
International Tax Policy, (Geneva/Zurich: Shulthess, 2016) 197.
161 See, e.g., Philip Baker, “The BEPS Action Plan in light of EU Law: Treaty Abuse” [2015] Brit. Tax Rev.
408, referring to the language of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive; and Danon, supra note 69 at 45-48,
referring to the ATAD and arguing that the PPT implicitly incorporates a “genuine economic activity”
element that corresponds to EU law. For a more detailed analysis which concludes that the PPT does
not contradict EU law, see Dennis Weber, “The Reasonableness Test of the Principal Purpose Test
155
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PPT adopts a lower purpose threshold than most domestic GAARs and will therefore
be easier for revenue authorities to apply than these anti-abuse provisions – a result
which is presumably intended by contracting jurisdictions to the MLI given extensive
criticism directed at this aspect of the PPT in comments on the BEPS Action 6
discussion draft.162
While the purpose test in the PPT is based on limited purpose tests in tax
treaties, these limited purpose tests are themselves derived from domestic tax law in
the United Kingdom, where several specific anti-avoidance rules apply where “one of
the main objects” or “one of the main purposes” of a transaction or arrangement was
to obtain a tax advantage.163 Not surprisingly, given the influence of U.K. income tax
law on Canadian income tax law,164 similar purpose tests also appear in several
specific anti-avoidance rules in Canada.165
Addressing this language in the context of a specific anti-avoidance rule, one
UK case concluded that the concept of a main object or purpose “envisages … a range

Rule in OECD BEPS Action 6 (Tax Treaty Abuse) versus the EU Principle of Legal Certainty and the EU
Abuse of Law Case Law,” (2017) 10 Erasmus Law Rev. 48.
162 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Comments Received on Public
Discussion Draft ‘BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate
Circumstances” (2014).
163 Jonathan Schwarz, Schwarz on Tax Treaties, 3d ed., (London: CCH, 2013) at 421.
164 Benjamin Alarie and David G. Duff, “The Legacy of UK Tax Concepts in Canadian Income Tax Law”
Influence of U.K. Tax Law on Canadian Tax Law,” [2008] British Tax Rev. 228.
165 See, e.g., ITA, s. 83(2.1) which deems a dividend to be a taxable dividend and not a capital dividend
where the dividend is paid on a share that was acquired by its holder in a transaction or as part of a
series of transactions “one of the main purposes” of which was to receive the dividend: s. 94.1(1)
which includes an amount in respect of offshore investment fund property, among other
circumstances, where “one of the main reasons” for the taxpayer acquiring, holding or having an
interest in this property was to derive a benefit from portfolio investments in such a manner that the
taxes on income, profits against gains from such assets are significantly less than they would have
been if the income, profits or gains had been earned directly by the taxpayer; and s. 256.1(6) which
deems the attribute trading restrictions to apply as if control of one or more corporations were
acquired where control of a particular corporation is acquired by a person or group of persons and it
can reasonably be concluded that “one of the main reasons” for the acquisition of control is so that a
specified provision does not apply to one or more corporations.
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of objectives” which “must be assessed in some sort of priority or hierarchy” in order
to determine “which are of sufficient significance to count as ‘main’ from those which
are not.”166 Another case states that a main purpose is always “more than trivial” and
“has a connotation of importance.” 167 Other UK decisions have held that a tax
advantage may be a main object or purpose of a transaction “even if the transaction
… had a commercial objective at least as important” as the tax advantage,168 and will
necessarily be a main object or purpose of a transaction if the transaction is “so
influenced by [its] tax effect” that is it “reasonable to assume that the tax effect must
have been one of the main purposes” of the transaction169 – for example if the
transaction as structured would not have been undertaken but for the tax
advantage. 170 Where transactions are entered into for a “genuine commercial
purpose,” on the other hand, and are not deliberately structured in way to obtain a
tax advantage, the tax advantage cannot be regarded as a main object or purpose of
the transaction.171
The commentary on the OECD model convention is broadly consistent with
these judicial decisions, stating that the PPT may apply where “at least one of the
principal purposes” of a transaction or arrangement was to obtain a benefit under a
tax treaty, notwithstanding that there may also be other principal purposes for the
Lloyds TSB Equipment Leasing (No. 1) Ltd. v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs,
[2012] UKFTT 47 (TC) at para. 388. This statement was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Lloyds TSB Equipment Leasing (No. 1) Ltd.,
[2014] EWCA Civ 1062 at para. 52 [hereafter Lloyd’s TSB Equipment Leasing (CA)].
167 Travel Document Service & Ladbroke Group International v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s
Revenue & Customs, [2018] EWCA Civ 549 at para. 48 48 [hereafter Travel Document Service].
168 See, e.g., Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Lloyds TSB Equipment Leasing
(No. 1) Ltd., [2013] UKUT 0368 (TCC) at para. 82 [hereafter Lloyds TSB Equipment Leasing (TCC)].
169 AH Field (Holdings) Ltd. v. Revenue and Customs, [2012] TC 01800 at para. 126.
170 Ibid. at para. 176.
171 Lloyd’s TSB Equipment Leasing (CA), supra note 166 at para. 65.
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transaction or arrangement.172 As a result, it explains, where a person sells property
after changing residence and “one of the principal purposes” of this change “is to
obtain a benefit under a tax convention,” the PPT could apply “notwithstanding the
fact that there may also be other principal purposes for changing residence, such as
facilitating the sale of the property or the re-investment of the proceeds of the
alienation.” 173 In addition, it emphasizes, where an arrangement “can only be
reasonably explained by a benefit that arises under a treaty,” it necessarily follows
that “one of the principal purposes of that arrangement was to obtain the benefit.”174
In contrast, the commentary continues, a purpose will not be a principal
purpose if:
… it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all the relevant facts and
circumstances, that obtaining the benefit was not a principal consideration and would
not have justified entering into any arrangement or transaction that has, alone or
together with other transactions, resulted in the benefit.175

As a result, it maintains, where a transaction or arrangement is “inextricably linked
to a core commercial activity, and its form has not been driven by considerations of
obtaining a benefit, it is unlikely that its principal purpose will be considered to be to
obtain that benefit.”176 For example, where a company resident in one state (RCO)
establishes a manufacturing plant in a developing country “in order to benefit from

Paragraph 180 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
Ibid. This example corresponds to the facts in MIL Investments, supra note 128, where the trial
judge accepted the taxpayer’s testimony that it continued into Luxembourg primarily for business
reasons, notwithstanding a substantial tax benefit. As explained in the first part of this article, the
taxpayer conceded that the continuation into Luxembourg was primarily tax-motivated on appeal, but
the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision in any event on the grounds that the revenue
authority failed to establish that the transactions were abusive.
174 Paragraph 178 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
175 Paragraph 181 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
176 Ibid. Since the purpose test in the PPT refers not to “the principal purpose” of a transaction or
arrangement but to “one of the principal purposes” of the transaction or arrangement, the words “its
principal purpose” in this sentence should read “one of its principal purposes”.
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lower manufacturing costs”, the commentary concludes that “the principal purposes
for making that investment and building the plant are related to the expansion of
RCO’s business and the lower manufacturing costs of that country” – despite the fact
that the decision to invest in the developing country was “taken in light of” the fact
that the developing country was “the only one” of three countries considered with
which the state in which RCO is resident has a tax treaty.177
To some commentators, this example and specific statements in the
commentary on the OECD model convention suggest that the PPT should be applied
only where the primary purpose of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain a treaty
benefit, not where one of its principal purposes is to obtain the benefit.178 Indeed,
since the example indicates that investment was made in “the only one” of three
countries with which the state in which RCO is resident has a tax treaty, it is not clear
why obtaining treaty benefits was not “a principal purpose” of the investment, even
though it seems reasonable to conclude that it was not the primary purpose of the
investment.179 The commentary is also poorly drafted in two paragraphs where it
appears to suggest that the PPT can apply only where the principal purpose of a
transaction or arrangement is to obtain a treaty benefit, not where one of the
principal purposes of the transaction or arrangement is to obtain a treaty benefit.180

Example C in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
See, e.g., De Broe and Luts, supra note 65 at 145; and Vikram Chand, “The Principal Purpose Test in
the Multilateral Convention: An In-Depth Analysis” (2018), 46 Intertax 18 at 23.
179 As a result, the better reason why the PPT should not apply to this example is, as also stated in the
commentary, that obtaining treaty benefits in this case would be “in accordance with the object and
purpose of the provisions” of the tax treaty, which are “to encourage cross-border investment.”
Example C in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
180 See paragraph 174 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, stating the
purpose of the PPT is “to ensure that tax conventions apply in accordance with the purpose for which
they were entered into, i.e. to provide benefits in respect of bona fide exchanges of goods and
177
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Nonetheless, the conclusion that the PPT should apply only where the
primary purpose of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain a treaty benefit is
clearly at odds with the text of the PPT and with an explicit statement in the
Commentary that the phrase “one of the principal purposes” means that “obtaining
the benefit under a tax convention need not be the sole or dominant purpose of a
particular arrangement or transaction.” 181 As a result, despite the example and
poorly drafted statements in the commentary on the OECD model convention, it is
clear that the purpose test in the PPT is satisfied when “one of the principal
purposes” of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain a treaty benefit.
More plausibly, however, the statement in the commentary that “it is
unlikely” that a principal purpose of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain a
benefit where the transaction or arrangement is “inextricably linked to a core
commercial activity” suggests that the PPT may incorporate an implicit “genuine
economic activity” exception that generally precludes its application to transactions
or arrangements with real economic substance. 182 Indeed, this interpretation is
supported by several examples in the commentary, including the earlier example of
the manufacturing plant established in a developing country,183 which conclude that
transactions or arrangements with real economic substance would not be subject to

services, and movements of capital and persons as opposed to arrangements whose principal
objective is to secure a more favourable tax treatment” [emphasis added]; and paragraph 181 of the
commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, concluding that where an arrangement is
inextricably linked to a core commercial activity, it is unlikely that “its principal purpose” will be
considered to be to obtain a treaty benefit
181 Paragraph 180 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
182 See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 47;l and Chand, supra note 178 at 23.
183 Example C in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention,
summarized at supra text accompanying note 177.
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the PPT.184 Although it may often be concluded in these circumstances that obtaining
a treaty benefit was not a principal purpose of the transaction or arrangement,185 the
most persuasive reason for concluding that the PPT should not apply in these cases
is (as explained below) that providing treaty benefits for transactions or
arrangements with real economic substance is generally in accordance with the
object and purpose of tax treaties.186
(c)

Reasonableness of Conclusion
Although judicial decisions suggest that any purpose test must be assessed in

light of objective manifestations of purpose,187 the words “reasonable to conclude” in
the PPT make this objective assessment explicit, confirming that the purpose test in
the PPT, like the purpose test in the Canadian GAAR, considers “not what was in the
particular taxpayer’s mind but what a reasonable taxpayer would have considered
the purpose of the transaction.”188 Interpreting similar language in the Canadian
GAAR, the Federal Court of Appeal has held that “the focus will be on the relevant
facts and circumstances and not on statements of intention.”189

In addition to example C, see also examples G and K of paragraph 182 of the commentary on article
29 of the OECD model convention, and examples B and F of paragraph 187 of the commentary on
article 29 of the OECD model commentary. These examples are discussed at infra, text accompanying
notes 228-232.
185 See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 48, concluding that “substance is one of the key elements
allowing the taxpayer to demonstrate that … obtaining the relevant treaty benefit is not one of the
principal purposes of the arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that
benefit”.
186 Infra at text accompanying notes 228-232.
187 Supra text accompanying notes 146-149.
188 Arnold and Wilson, supra note 142 at 1157.
189 OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1381, [2001] 4 C.T.C. 82, 2001 D.T.C. 5471 (F.C.A.) at
para. 46 [hereafter OSFC].
184
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Similarly, the OECD Commentary states that “different interpretation of the
events must be objectively considered,” 190 and the PPT itself states that the
reasonableness of the conclusion that one of the principal purposes of an
arrangement or transaction was to obtain a treaty benefit must be determined
“having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances”.191 As well, the commentary
on the OECD model convention states that a person cannot avoid application of the
PPT “by merely asserting that the arrangement or transaction was not undertaken or
arranged to obtain the benefits” of a tax treaty. 192 As a result, the PPT clearly
requires an objective assessment of the purposes of the parties to the transaction or
arrangement.193
Unlike the Canadian GAAR, however, which does not apply where a
transaction may reasonably be considered to be undertaken or arranged primarily
for bona fide purposes other than to obtain a tax benefit, the PPT applies where it is
reasonable to conclude that one of the principal purposes of the transaction or
arrangement was to obtain a benefit. As a result, while the GAAR places the onus on
the taxpayer to disprove the underlying assumptions of fact on which the
assessment is based, the PPT places the onus on the revenue authority to establish
that a principal purpose of the transaction or arrangement was to obtain a treaty
benefit.

Paragraph 179 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention
Article 7(1) of the MLI.
192 Paragraph 179 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
193 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 161 at 49, observing that the “reasonableness test” requires “an
objective analysis” of the facts and circumstances in order to determine the subjective intention of the
taxpayer.
190
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More significantly, the reasonableness language in each provision operates
differently, resulting in a lower a lower burden for the revenue authority under the
PPT than under the Canadian GAAR. Under the GAAR, the taxpayer must provide a
reasonable explanation as to why the primary purpose of a transaction was not to
obtain a tax benefit, which the revenue authority must then refute by clearly and
unambiguously demonstrating that the primary purpose of the transaction was to
obtain a tax benefit. In contrast, the PPT requires the revenue authority to provide a
reasonable explanation as to why one of the principal purposes of an arrangement or
transaction was to obtain a benefit under a CTA, which the taxpayer must then refute
by clearly and unambiguously demonstrating that none of the principal purposes of
the transaction or arrangement was to obtain the benefit.194
As a result, the PPT not only adopts a lower purpose threshold than the
Canadian GAAR and most domestic GAARs, but effectively requires the taxpayer to
argue that it would be unreasonable to conclude that a principal purpose of a
transaction or arrangement was to obtain a benefit under a CTA.195 Since this may be
difficult to establish in the context of cross-border transactions or arrangements for
which tax implications are typically taken into account,196 the purpose test in the
PPT may be relatively easy to satisfy, as a result of which application of the PPT will

See, e.g., Lang, supra note 82 at 658, concluding that this requirement is “not too demanding” since
the revenue department’s argument need only be “reasonable” not “compelling”.
195 See, e.g., DeBroe and Luts, supra note 65 at 145, concluding on this basis that the purpose
threshold in the PPT “is set extremely low”.
196 See, e.g., Erik Pinetz, “Final Report on Action 6 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Initiative: Prevention of Treaty Abuse” (2016), 70 Bulletin for International Taxation 113 at 11; and
Ansh Bhargava, “The Principal Purpose Test: Functioning, Elements and Legal Relevance” in Daniel W.
Blum and Markus Seiler, eds., Preventing Treaty Abuse, (Vienna: Linde, 2016) 311 at 318..
194
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turn primarily on whether granting the benefit is in accordance the object and
purpose of the relevant provisions of the CTA.197
(3)

Object and Purpose Test
Where the result test and the purpose test are satisfied, the PPT applies to

deny a treaty benefit “unless it is established that granting that benefit in these
circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant
provisions” of the CTA. Similarly, the guiding principle applies only where obtaining
a more favourable tax position “would be contrary to the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions” of a tax treaty,198 and the Canadian GAAR applies only if it may
reasonably be considered that the transaction results in a misuse of provisions of the
ITA or other relevant enactments or an abuse having regard to these provisions read
as a whole 199 – which entails an inquiry into the object and purpose of these
provisions.200
In contrast to the object and purpose tests in the guiding principle and the
Canadian GAAR, however, which constitute an additional requirement that must be
satisfied if benefits that would otherwise be available are to be denied, the object
and purpose test in the PPT operates as an exception to the general anti-abuse rule,
allowing treaty benefits that would otherwise be denied by the provision. As a result,
while the object and purpose tests in the guiding principle and the Canadian GAAR
See, e.g., Lang supra note 82 at 658-59, suggesting on this basis that the purpose test in the PPT
“runs the risk of not gaining any significance in itself.”
198 Paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2017 OECD model convention.
199 ITA, s. 245(4).
200 See, e.g., Copthorne Holdings, supra note 107 at para. 55, explaining that the characterization of an
avoidance transaction as abusive is ultimately a matter of statutory interpretation, in which a court
must first “determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions” that are relied upon in order to
obtain the tax benefit, and then decide whether the transaction defeats or frustrates this identified
purpose.
197
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require the revenue authorities to establish that a benefit that a taxpayer would
otherwise obtain would contradict the object and purpose of relevant provisions, the
PPT requires the taxpayer to establish that a benefit that would otherwise be denied
should be allowed because it is in accordance with the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions of a CTA.
This section examines each of the elements of the object and purpose test in
the PPT, considering: (1) the identification of “relevant provisions” of a CTA, (2)
whether the treaty benefit is in accordance with the “object and purpose” of these
provisions, and (3) the effect of making the object and purpose test an exception to
the general anti-abuse rule.
(a)

Relevant Provisions
In order to determine whether a benefit that would otherwise be denied

under the PPT may be granted under the object and purposes exception, it is first
necessary to identify the “provisions” of the CTA that are “relevant” to this object and
purpose test. Although the meaning of a “relevant provision” is neither defined in the
MLI nor discussed in the OECD Commentary, this concept necessarily includes the
specific provision that is relied upon in order to obtain the benefit under the CTA –
for example, the article of a CTA that provides a reduced withholding tax rate or
exemption from source taxation. Where a company increases its shareholding in
another company in order to obtain a lower withholding tax rate on dividends, for
example, the treaty provision under which this lower rate is granted is obviously
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relevant to the object and purpose test. 201 Likewise, where person splits up a
contract in order to avoid permanent establishment status for a building site or
construction or installation project, the treaty provision that excludes short-term
contracts from permanent establishment status is clearly relevant to the object and
purpose test.202
As well, where a person carries out a transaction or arrangement in order to
circumvent the application of another treaty provision, this other provision is
presumably also relevant to the object and purpose test. For example, where a
person contributes assets to a corporation in order to circumvent a substituted
property rule like article 13(4) of the OECD model convention, this provision is at
least as relevant to an object and purpose analysis as the general treaty provision
that exempts gains from taxation in the source state that is actually relied upon in
order to obtain the treaty benefit.
In addition, although the PPT refers only to the object and purpose of
“relevant provisions” of a CTA and not the object and purpose of the CTA as a whole
or of the provisions of the CTA read as a whole,203 these are undoubtedly also

See example E in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention,
concluding that an increase in a company’s shareholding in order to obtain a reduced withholding tax
rate under article 10(2)(a) of the OECD model convention was in accordance with the object and
purpose of this provision.
202 See example J in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention,
concluding that the splitting-up of a contract in order to avoid permanent establishment status was
contrary to the object and purpose of article 5(3) of the OECD model convention.
203 In this respect, the PPT (and the guiding principle) differ from the Canadian GAAR, which
contemplates a misuse of provisions of the ITA and other relevant enactments and an abuse “having
regard to those provisions, other than this section, read as a whole.” ITA, s. 245(4). In OSFC, supra
note 189 at para. 64, the Federal Court of Appeal held that this language contemplates “an object and
spirit, or policy, analysis of the provisions in question or the provisions of the Act read as a whole” –
with one level of analysis directed at the specific provisions at issue and another level of analysis
concerned with the broader purpose, scheme or policy of the ITA as a whole. In Canada Trustco, supra
note 70, however, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected this two-level analysis, concluding (at para.
201
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relevant to an object and purpose analysis, since the object and purpose of a tax
treaty is necessarily realized through its specific provisions and the object and
purpose of specific provisions are presumably intended to fulfill the object and
purpose of the treaty as a whole.204 Indeed, although it is arguable that the preamble
of a CTA is not technically a “provision” of a CTA, it would be absurd to assume that
the preamble is not a “relevant provision” for the purposes of the object and purpose
test in the PPT, particularly since the amended preamble language in article 6(1) of
the MLI is clearly intended to influence the interpretation of provisions of a CTA,205
including the PPT.206 As a result, although relevance of the provisions of a CTA as a
whole to the application of the PPT is not as clear as it might be if the PPT specifically
referred to the object and purpose of relevant provisions of the CTA and the

43) that the GAAR “requires a single, unified approach to the … interpretation of the specific
provisions of the Income Tax Act that are relied upon by the taxpayer in order to determine whether
there was abusive tax avoidance.” Although the Supreme Court of Canada’s subsequent decision in
Copthorne Holdings, supra note 107, reaffirmed this “unified” approach, it appears to have broadened
the scope of the misuse or abuse analysis to include not only “the specific provisions … relied upon by
the taxpayer” to obtain a tax benefit but also other provisions that necessary to understand the
statutory scheme.
204 See, e.g., De Broe, International Tax Planning and the Prevention of Abuse, supra note 115 at 330;
Kok, supra note 93 at 409, stating that “the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty provision has to be
interpreted in light of the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty in general”; Danon, supra note 69 at 45,
observing that “it is generally not obvious to assign a specific purpose to treaty provisions such as the
distributive rules whose general objective is simply to allocate taxing rights with a view to eliminating
double taxation”; and Chand, supra note 178 at 26, concluding that “the object and purpose of the
‘relevant provisions’ have to be read in light of the object and purpose of the entire tax treaty.”
205 See paragraph 16.2 of the introduction to the commentary on the OECD model convention,
emphasizing that the title and preamble of the OECD Model Convention “form part of the context of
the Convention and constitute a general statement of the object and purpose of the Convention,” and
should therefore “play an important role in the interpretation of the provisions of the Convention.”
206 See paragraph 173 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention, emphasizing
that the PPT “must be read in the context of [the limitation on benefit provisions in] paragraphs 1 to 7
and of the rest of the Convention, including the Preamble.” [emphasis added] According to the
commentary, “[t]his is particularly important for determining the object and purpose of the relevant
provisions of the Convention.”
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provisions of the CTA read as a whole,207 it is not surprising that several of the tax
treaty-shopping examples in the commentary on the OECD model convention refer
to the object and purpose of the tax convention as a whole rather than the object and
purpose of specific provisions under which treaty benefits are conferred.208
Less clear, though potentially also relevant to an object and purpose analysis,
are provisions of the MLI or model tax treaties that are not included in the particular
CTA – for example, the simplified LOB provisions in articles 7(8)-(13) of the MLI, the
specific anti-avoidance rule for dividend transfer transactions in article 8(1) of the
MLI, or the anti-avoidance rule for capital gains from the alienation of shares or
comparable interests deriving their value principally from immovable property in
article 9(1) of the MLI. Although it might be argued that an absence of agreement on
the inclusion of these provisions in a CTA evidences an intention on the part of the
contracting jurisdictions to permit arrangements or transactions that might
otherwise be prohibited by these provisions, 209 it is also arguable that the
contracting jurisdictions intended to rely on the more general language of the PPT to
challenge these transactions or arrangements without adopting the detailed

On this point, see Danon, supra note 69 at 45, suggesting that there is “an inherent conceptual
difficulty to apply the PPT rule which may entail uncertainties if the decision to deny treaty benefits is
simply made on the basis of a general purpose of the treaty as modified by the MLI.”
208 See, e.g., examples A, B, and C in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model
convention, concluding that the “treaty-shopping arrangements” in Examples A and B “would be
contrary to the object and purpose of the tax convention” whereas the selection of a state in which to
establish a manufacturing plant “in light of” a tax treaty would be “in accordance with the object and
purpose of provisions of that convention” because “a general objective of tax conventions is to
encourage cross-border investment”. See also Examples D and K in paragraph 182 of the commentary
on article 29 of the OECD model convention, which conclude that the PPT would not apply in large
part because the “intent of tax treaties” is “to provide benefits to encourage cross-border investment”.
209 See, e.g., Kok, supra note 93 at 411, arguing that the PPT should not apply to deny a treaty benefit
resulting from a dividend transfer transaction if the dividend article does not include a minimum
shareholding period. For a judicial example of this approach, see Knights of Columbus, supra note 84.
207
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limitations of these SAARs.210 Either way, as discussed earlier in addressing the
relationship between the PPT and specific anti-avoidance rules,211 the absence of a
provision that might otherwise be included in a CTA could be relevant to the object
and purpose analysis.
(b)

Treaty Benefit in Accordance with Object and Purpose of Relevant
Provisions
Once the “relevant provisions” are identified, it is necessary to determine

their objects and purposes in order to decide whether granting a benefit that might
otherwise be denied under the PPT is in accordance with these object and purposes.
As with the misuse or abuse analysis under the Canadian GAAR, this process can be
divided into two analytical stages: first, identifying the objects and purposes or
“policy” of the relevant provisions; second, assessing the facts of the transaction or
arrangement to determine whether granting a benefit in these circumstances is in
accordance with these objects and purposes.212
As also with the misuse and abuse analysis under the Canadian GAAR, the
first of these stages involves an interpretive exercise that differs from the ordinary
interpretation of a statute or a treaty, since its aim is not to determine the meaning
of the relevant provisions in light of their objects and purposes, but to determine
“the rationale that underlies the words” of these provisions, which “may or may not

See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 43, concluding that “[w]here a state has reserved the right not to
apply” the specific anti-abuse rules in articles 8(1) and 9(1) of the MLI, “the PPT would thus apply by
default to those situations.”
211 Supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text under the heading “Relevance of Specific Treaty AntiAbuse Rules not Included in a CTA”.
212 This “two-stage analytical process” was adopted in OSFC, supra note 189 at para. 67, and endorsed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Trustco, supra note 70 at para. 44. Chand also considers
this two-stage analysis appropriate for the object and purpose test in the PPT. Chand, supra note 178
at 26.
210
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be captured by the … words” of the provisions themselves.213 For this reason, it is
wrong to conclude that the object and purpose test in the PPT simply incorporates
ordinary principles of treaty interpretation, which must always consider the objects
and purposes of treaty provisions.214
(i)

Interpreting the Object and Purpose of a Treaty Provision
In order to interpret the object and purpose of a treaty provision, it is always

necessary to consider the text of the provision,215 construing its rationale or policy in
the context of other treaty provisions including the preamble, as well as extrinsic
materials such as explanatory memoranda and commentaries (provided that the
commentaries are not subject to any relevant reservations).216 While the text of a
treaty provision may not fully capture its object and purpose, it often provides some
basis on which its object and purpose may reasonably be inferred, particularly when
the provision is read in the context of other provisions.
For example, although article 5(3) of the OECD model convention states only
that “[a] building site or construction or installation project constitutes a permanent
establishment only if it lasts more than twelve months”, it is reasonable to conclude
that the object or purpose of this provision is to exclude short-term building or
construction or installation projects from source taxation of business profits that
Copthorne Holdings, supra note 107 at para. 70, explaining that “traditional statutory
interpretation” seeks to determine the meaning of a statutory text, while a misuse or abuse analysis
under the GAAR seeks “the rationale that underlies the words that may or may not be captured by the
bare meaning of the words.”
214 Lang, supra note 82 at 661, referring to article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Signed at Vienna on May 23, 1969, UN doc. A/Conf. 39/27, fourth annex, UNTS 1155/331.
215 Frank Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2004) at
175.
216 Kok, supra note 93 at 409. On the relevance of interpretative memoranda and commentaries on
the OECD model convention to the interpretation of Canada’s tax treaties, see Crown Forest Industries
Ltd. v. Canada, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 64, 95 D.T.C. 5389 (S.C.C.).
213
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would otherwise be permitted under article 7(1) of the OECD model convention if
the project were characterized as a permanent establishment. Likewise, although the
substituted property rule in article 13(4) of the OECD model convention does not
explicitly say so, it is reasonable to infer from its text and its relationship to articles
13(1) and (5) of the OECD model convention that its object or purpose is “to prevent
the non-taxation by the source state of capital gains derived principally from
immovable property situated in the source state.”217
In other circumstances, the object and purpose of a provision may be
suggested by the text and clarified by extrinsic materials. According to the
commentary on the OECD model convention, for example, the reduced withholding
tax rate on dividends under article 10(2)(a) of the convention is intended to impose
a lower tax on “dividends paid by a subsidiary company to its parent company” in
order “to avoid recurrent taxation and facilitate international investment.”218 The
commentary also explains that the object and purpose of article 15(2) of the OECD
model convention is:
… to avoid the source taxation of short-term employments to the extent that the
employment income is not allowed as a deductible expense in the State of source
because the employer is not taxable in that State as it neither is a resident nor has a
permanent establishment therein.219

In each of these cases, the commentary confirms a plausible interpretation that
might reasonably be inferred from the text of the provisions themselves.
Alta Energy Luxembourg S.A.R.L. v. The Queen, [2018] T.C.C. 152 [hereafter Alta Energy] at para. 41,
observing that: “Absent this rule, it would be possible … to conduct a share sale instead of an asset
sale to avoid taxation in the source state.”
218 Paragraph 10 of the commentary on article 10 of the OECD model convention.
219 Paragraph 6.2 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention, adding that the
provision “can also be justified by the fact that imposing source deduction requirements with respect
to short-term employments in a given State may be considered to constitute an excessive
administrative burden where the employer neither resides nor has a permanent establishment in that
State.”
217
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Where the text of a treaty provision does not itself suggest specific rationale,
on the other hand, its object and purpose can generally be construed in light of the
objects and purposes of the treaty as a whole. Although the specific object and
purpose of each distributive rule in a tax treaty may not be immediately obvious, for
example, the overall object and purpose of these provisions is generally understood
to be to allocate taxing rights among contracting states in a fair and reasonable
manner in order to encourage cross-border economic activity by reducing or
eliminating economic double taxation.220 As the U.S. Fifth Circuit court stated in
Johansson v. United States,221 the “primary objective” of tax treaties is to eliminate
“impediments to international commerce resulting from the double taxation of
international transactions” by allocating tax jurisdiction to the “most appropriate
locus for the taxation of any given transaction.” Consistent with these objects and
purposes, the title to the 2017 OECD model convention explicitly states that one of
its purposes is “the elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income
and capital” and the preamble to this model states among other things that the
contracting states desire “to further develop their economic relationship”.222
In addition to these established objects and purposes, however, it is also
generally accepted that tax treaties are not intended to facilitate tax avoidance,223

See, e.g., De Broe, International Tax Planning and the Prevention of Abuse, supra note 115 at 344.
336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964) at 813.
222 Although the MLI does not include a provision to modify the title of CTAs, contracting jurisdictions
may adopt optional preamble language in article 6(3) expressing a desire “to further develop their
economic relationship”. Of eighty-four signatories to the MLI as of 18 September 2018, fifty-five (not
including Canada) had adopted this optional preamble language. Since encouraging economic
relationships among contracting states is a well-recognized object and purpose of tax treaties, it is not
clear that this preamble language will have any impact on the interpretation of tax treaties generally
or the PPT in particular.
223 See, e.g.,De Broe, International Tax Planning and the Prevention of Abuse, supra note 115 at 337.
220
221

63

and the preamble to the 2017 OECD model convention and article 6(1) of the MLI
explicitly state that CTAs are not intended to create “opportunities for non-taxation
or reduced taxation through tax … avoidance (including through treaty-shopping
arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect
benefit of residents of third jurisdictions).” In construing the objects and purposes of
a CTA that is modified by this preamble language, therefore, it is necessary to
consider not only the primary aim of the CTA to encourage cross-border economic
activity by allocating taxing rights in a fair and reasonable manner in order to reduce
or eliminate double taxation, but also the intention of the contracting jurisdictions
that the CTA not create opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through
tax treaty shopping and other forms of tax avoidance. For this reason, when
interpreting the object and purpose of a CTA that is modified by this preamble
language, it is no longer possible to conclude, as the Supreme Court of India did in
the context of the India-Mauritius Tax Treaty, that treaty shopping is necessarily
consistent with the object and purpose of tax treaties because it encourages capital
and technology inflows.224
Finally, it is notable that the commentary on the OECD model convention
states that the purpose of the PPT is:
… to ensure that tax conventions apply in accordance with the purpose for which
they were entered into, i.e. to provide benefits in respect of bona fide exchanges of
goods and services, and movements of capital and persons as opposed to
arrangements whose principal objective is to secure a more favourable tax
treatment.225

Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003), 6 ITLR 233 (S.C.), available
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1960330/. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
225 Paragraph 174 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
224
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Although this statement wrongly refers to the “principal objective” of an
arrangement (as opposed to “one of its principal purposes”) and appears to
erroneously conflate the PPT’s object and purpose test with its purpose test by
stating that it would be contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty to provide
benefits for arrangements whose principal objective is to obtain these benefits, a
more plausible interpretation is that the primary purpose of a CTA with the
amended preamble language is not simply to allocate taxing rights in order to
encourage cross-border economic activity by reducing or eliminating double
taxation, but to do so in a way that encourages bona fide or genuine cross-border
economic activities rather than tax-motivated transactions or arrangements with
little or no economic substance. Indeed, examples in the commentary on the OECD
model convention provide further confirmation that providing treaty benefits for
bona fide transactions or arrangements with real economic substance is generally in
accordance with the object and purpose of tax treaties, even if one of the purposes or
even a principal purpose of these transactions or arrangements is to obtain treaty
benefits.
(ii)

Assessing the Facts
Having determined the objects and purposes of the relevant provisions,

application of the object and purpose test in the PPT depends on a factual
assessment of the transactions or arrangements at issue in order to determine
whether granting a benefit is in accordance with these objects and purposes. For
treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements, which could otherwise enable a
person to obtain a variety of treaty benefits, this assessment will generally relate to
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the objects and purposes of the treaty as a whole – asking whether granting a treaty
benefit is in accordance with the primary purpose of the treaty to encourage genuine
cross-border economic activity by allocating taxing rights and reducing or
eliminating double taxation, without creating opportunities for non-taxation or
reduced taxation through tax avoidance (including through treaty-shopping
arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this agreement for the indirect
benefit of residents of third jurisdictions). For rule-shopping transactions or
arrangements, on the other hand, this factual assessment is more likely to address
the objects and purposes of specific treaty provisions, the formal requirements of
which are either satisfied or circumvented by a particular transaction or
arrangement – asking whether granting a treaty benefit in these circumstances is in
accordance with the objects and purposes of these provisions.226 Although these
factual assessments necessarily depend on the specific circumstances of the
transactions or arrangements at issue, at least some guidance on the possible
application of the object and purpose test may be drawn from examples in the
commentary on the OECD model convention as well as cases discussed in the first
part of this article.227

In this circumstance, the analysis is similar to the second-stage of the misuse and abuse analysis
under the Canadian GAAR, determining whether a transaction or arrangement (1) achieves an
outcome that the relevant provisions seek to prevent; (2) defeats the underlying rationale of the
relevant provisions; or (3) circumvents the relevant provisions in a manner that frustrates or defeats
their object or purpose. See Canada Trustco, supra note 70 at para. 45; reaffirmed in Copthorne
Holdings, supra note 107 at para. 71.
227 For a detailed discussion of the examples in the commentary on the OECD model convention, see
Chand, supra note 178 at 27-38.
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(A)

Tax Treaty Shopping
Beginning with tax treaty shopping, it is notable that examples in the

commentary on the OECD model convention consistently suggest that the PPT would
not apply to transactions or arrangements that involve genuine cross-border
economic activities. In the earlier example of a company resident in State R that
establishes a manufacturing plant in the only one of three developing countries with
which State R has a tax treaty, the commentary concludes that this investment would
be “in accordance with the object and purpose of the provisions of that convention”
because “a general objective of tax conventions is to encourage cross-border
investment”.228 Likewise, in an example involving an institutional investor in State T,
which establishes a wholly-owned subsidiary (RCO) in State R, which invests in a
company (SCO) resident in State S, with which State R has a more advantageous tax
treaty than State T, the commentary observes that “[t]he intent of tax treaties is to
provide benefits to encourage cross-border investment” and concludes that the PPT
would not apply, even though the decision to establish RCO in State R is driven partly
by “the extensive tax convention network of State R, including its tax convention
with State S, which provides for low withholding tax rates” because of the following
factors:
(1) the decision to establish RCO is also driven by “the availability of
directors with knowledge of regional business practices and
regulations, the existence of a skilled multilingual workforce, and State
R’s membership in a regional grouping”;
(2) “RCO employs an experienced local management team to review
investment recommendations from Fund and performs various other
functions which, depending on the case, may include approving and
228

Example C in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
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monitoring investments, carrying out treasury functions, maintaining
RCO’s book and records, and ensuring compliance with regulatory
requirements in States where it invests”;
(3) RCO’s board of directors “is… composed of a majority of State R
resident directors with expertise in investment management”; and
(4) the investment in SCO “would constitute only a part of RCO’s
overall investment portfolio, which includes investments in a number
of countries in addition to State S which are also members o the same
regional grouping.”229
In another example, where a company resident in one state establishes a
regional company (RCO) in State R with a comprehensive tax treaty network in
order to provide group services to subsidiaries that are resident in other states, the
commentary concludes that the PPT should not apply to deny the benefits of the tax
treaties concluded between State R and the states in which the subsidiaries reside,
provided that:
… the intra-group services to be provided by RCO, including the making of decisions
necessary for the conduct of its business, constitute a real business through which
RCO exercises substantive economic functions, using real assets and assuming real
risks, and that business is carried on by RCO through its own personnel located in
State R,

unless other facts “indicate that RCO has been established for other tax purposes” or
“RCO enters into specific transactions to which [the PPT] would otherwise apply.”230
Similarly, where the parent company of a worldwide group (TCO) that is resident in
State T lends funds to a finance subsidiary (RCO) in State R, which lends the same
amount on the same day at the same interest rate to a company (SCO) that is a
member of the worldwide group and resident in State S, with which R has a tax
treaty but T does not have a tax treaty, the commentary concludes that the back to

229
230

Example K in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention
Example G in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
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back loans “do not constitute a conduit arrangement” to which the PPT or anticonduit provisions should apply because:
(1) RCO carries on a “normal treasury business” for TCO,
“coordinating the financing of all the subsidiaries of TCO”,
“maintain[ing] a centralized cash management accounting system for
TCO and its subsidiaries … disbursing or receiving any cash payments
required by transactions between its affiliates and unrelated parties”
and “enter[ing] into interest rate and foreign exchange contracts as
necessary to manage the risks arising from mismatches in incoming
and outgoing cash flows”;
(2) RCO’s activities “are intended (and reasonably can be expected) to
reduce transaction costs and overhead and other fixed costs)”;
(3) “RCO has 50 employees, including clerical and other back office
personnel, located in State R [reflecting] the size of the business
activities of RCO”;
(4) RCO therefore “appears to be carrying on a real business
performing substantive economic functions, using real assets and
assuming real risks”;
(5) RCO performs “significant activities with respect to the
transactions with TCO and SCO, which appear to be typical of RCO’s
normal treasury business”; and
(6) “RCO appears to be bearing the interest rate and currency risk.”231
In yet another example, where a manufacturing company (RCO) resident in
State R, the shares of which are wholly owned by a company (TCO) resident in State
T, establishes a subsidiary (SCO) in order to act as its exclusive distributor in State S,
with which T does not have a tax treaty, the commentary also concludes that the
arrangement would not be regarded as a conduit arrangement because the example
involves “a normal commercial structure where RCO and SCO carry on real economic

231

Example F in paragraph 187 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
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activities in States R and S” and “[t]he payment of dividends by subsidiaries such as
SCO is a normal business transaction.”232
In contrast, where transactions or arrangements have little or no real
economic substance, the commentary on the OECD Model Convention concludes that
the PPT or anti-conduit provisions should apply to deny treaty benefits. In one
example, based on the Royal Dutch Oil Company case,233 a company (TCO) resident in
State T which owns shares of a company (SCO) resident in State S, with which State T
does not have a tax treaty, assigns the right to dividends that have been declared but
not yet paid by SCO to RCO, an independent financial institution resident in State R,
which has a tax treaty with State S that exempts dividends from withholding tax.234
In this circumstance, the commentary concludes that:
… it would be reasonable to conclude that one of the principal purposes for the
arrangement … was for RCO to obtain the benefit of the exemption from source
taxation of dividends provided for by the State R – State S tax convention and it
would be contrary to the object and purpose of the tax convention to grant the benefit
of that exemption under this treaty-shopping arrangement. 235

In another example, based on the Bank of Scotland case,236 a company (TCO)
resident in State T which has a wholly owned subsidiary (SCO) resident in State S,
with which State T does not have a tax treaty, enters into an agreement with a
financial institution (RCO) in State R, with which State S has a tax treaty under which
the withholding tax rate on dividends is reduced to 5 percent from the domestic rate
of 25 percent.237 Under this agreement, RCO acquires the usufruct of newly-issued

Example B in paragraph 187 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention
Supra note 126. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
234 Example A in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
235 Ibid. [emphasis added]
236 Supra note 127. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
237 Example B in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
232
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preferred shares of SCO for a period of three years in exchange for the present value
of the dividends to be paid on the preferred shares over three years, discounted at
the rate at which TCO could borrow from RCO. In this circumstance as well, the
commentary concludes that:
… it would be reasonable to conclude that one of the principal purposes for the
arrangement … was to obtain the benefit of the 5 per cent limitation applicable to
the source taxation of dividends provided for by the State R – State S tax convention
and it would be contrary to the object and purpose of the tax convention to grant the
benefit of that limitation under this treaty-shopping arrangement.238

Yet another example, based on Aiken Industries Inc. v. Commissioner, 239
involves a company (TCO) resident in State T which loans funds at a rate of 7 percent
to a wholly owned subsidiary (SCO) in State S, which does not have a tax treaty with
State T, and then assigns the debt to another wholly-owned subsidiary (RCO) in State
R, with which State S has a tax treaty, in exchange for a note paying interest at a rate
of 6 percent.240 Emphasizing that the assignment “was structured to eliminate the
withholding tax that TCO would otherwise have paid to State S”, the commentary
concludes that the transaction “constitutes a conduit arrangement” to which the PPT
or anti-conduit provisions should apply.241
In addition to the specific cases on which they are based, these examples
suggest that the PPT could also apply to transactions or arrangements like those in

Ibid. [emphasis added]
56 T.C. 925 (1971) [hereafter Aiken Industries]. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
240 Example C in paragraph 187 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention. This
example differs slightly from the facts in Aiken Industries, supra note 239, where the debt was
assigned for a note paying interest at the same rate as the original loan. If the debt were assigned for a
note paying interest at the same rate as the original loan, it is likely that the original lender TCO,
rather than RCO, would be regarded as the beneficial owner of the interest.
241 Ibid.
238
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Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,242 X Holdings ApS
v. Federal Tax Administration,243 the VSA case,244 and the HHU and Cook cases, 245 in
which companies with little or no economic substance were established in order to
obtain treaty benefits that would otherwise have been unavailable. They also suggest
that the PPT could apply to transactions or arrangements like those in Northern
Indiana Public Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 246 Prévost Car, 247 Velcro, 248 and the
Spanish cases involving payments by the Real Madrid football team to Hungarian
companies for the image rights of various team members,249 in which companies to
which interest, dividends or royalties were paid appear to have earned some profits
on the spread between amounts received and amounts paid as well as reinvested
profits, but otherwise conducted little or no business activity. In contrast, it seems
less likely that the PPT should apply to payments such as those in the Swiss Swap
case which are designed to hedge against swap payments – at least where these
T.C. Memo 1999-411, aff’d 251 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir. 2001), denying treaty benefits on the basis of a
domestic substance over form doctrine. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
243 (2005) 8 ITLR 536, denying treaty benefits on the basis of an implicit anti-abuse principle. This
case is discussed in the first part of this article.
244 Swiss Commission of Appeals in Tax Matters, 28 February 2001, 4 ILTS 2002, 191, denying treaty
benefits on the grounds that the recipient of dividends was not their beneficial owner. This case is
discussed in the first part of this article.
245 SKM 2011.57 LSR, and SKM 2011.485 LSR, denying treaty benefits on the grounds that the
recipients of interest payments were not their beneficial owners. These cases are discussed in the
first part of this article.
246 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997), allowing treaty benefits on the basis that a wholly-owned finance
subsidiary incorporated by the taxpayer had conducted “recognizable” though “concededly minimal”
business activity, earning a profit from the spread between interest paid on Euronotes and interest
charged to the taxpayer as well as reinvested profits. This case is discussed in the first part of this
article.
247 Supra note 124, allowing treaty benefits on the basis that the recipient of dividends was their
beneficial owner. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
248 Supra note 125, allowing treaty benefits on the basis that the recipient of royalty payments was
their beneficial owner. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
249 AN 18 July 2006, JUR\2006\204307, JUR\2007\8915 and JUR\2007\6549; AN 10 Nov. 2006
JUR\2006\284679; AN 20 July 2006, JUR\2007\6526; AN 13 Nov. 2006, JUR\200\284618; and AN
26 Mar. 2007, JUR\2007\101877, denying treaty benefits on the basis that the recipients of the
royalty payments were not their beneficial owners. This case is discussed in the first part of this
article.
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arrangements represent genuine business activities carried out by a financial
institution.250
Less clear are transactions or arrangements involving tax-motivated changes
of residence, which the commentary on the OECD model convention states “may” or
“could” be subject to the PPT,251 without explicitly discussing circumstances in which
these transactions or arrangements might or might not be in accordance with the
object and purpose of the relevant provisions of a tax treaty.252 If the primary
purpose of tax treaties is to encourage genuine cross-border economic activities,
however, it might be reasonable to conclude a change of residence with real
economic substance should not be subject to the PPT, even if one of the principal
purposes of this change was to obtain a treaty benefit. This might be the case, for
example, with a change of residence by an individual, at least to the extent that it
requires a real social and economic presence.253
In contrast, where a corporation changes its residence by continuing from
one jurisdiction to another or by changing its place of effective management, it is less
certain that this transaction or arrangement would have sufficient economic
substance to conclude that obtaining treaty benefits would be in accordance with the
object and purpose of the relevant provisions of a treaty – particularly if the change
CH: Federal Supreme Court (FSC), 5 May 2015, BGE 141 II 447, no. 2C_364/2012 [herein referred
to as the Swiss Swap case], concluding that the recipient of payments from investments designed to
hedge against swap payments was not the beneficial owner of the payments. This case is discussed in
the first part of this article.
251 Paragraphs 177 and 180 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
252 Kok, supra note 93 at 411.
253 David G. Duff, “Responses to Tax Treaty Shopping: A Comparative Evaluation” in Michael Lang, et.
al., Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics, (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010) 75 at 77, n.
11, suggesting that tax-motivated changes of residence by individuals are “rightly regarded as a form
of treaty shopping, but … less likely to be abusive [than tax-motivated changes of residence by
artificial entities] given the requirement of a real social and economic presence for individual tax
residence.”
250
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of residence results in non-taxation or reduced taxation and treaty benefits are
indirectly obtained by shareholders who are residents of third jurisdictions.254 For
this reason, the PPT could be expected to apply to transactions such as those in MIL
Investments in which the taxpayer continued from the Cayman Island to Luxembourg
shortly before selling shares the gain from which would otherwise have been subject
to tax in Canada,255 and Yanko-Weiss Holdings in which the taxpayer moved its place
of effective management from Israel to Belgium before receiving dividends from an
Israeli subsidiary.256
(B)

Other Treaty Abuses
With respect to other treaty abuses, neither the commentary on the OECD

model convention nor the Final Report on BEPS Action 6 are as clear on the potential
role of the PPT – presumably because BEPS Action 6, the MLI and the 2017 OECD
model convention all contain specific anti-abuse rules to address perceived treaty
abuses other than tax treaty shopping.257 Where a CTA does not include these
specific anti-abuse rules, however, it is possible that the PPT could apply to taxmotivated transactions or arrangements that either satisfy or circumvent the formal

For a contrary conclusion, see Kok, supra note 93 at 411, arguing that a change of corporate
residence should not be subject to the PPT if the relevant treaty includes a tie-breaker rule based on
place of effective management. This argument depends on the conclusion that the PPT should not
apply to transactions or arrangements that could be subject to a specific anti-avoidance rule if it were
included in a tax treaty – in this case, a tie-breaker rule based on the mutual agreement procedure as
in article 4(1) of the MLI. This conclusion was rejected earlier in this article at supra text
accompanying notes 84-100 under the heading “Relevance of Specific Treaty Anti-Abuse Rules not
Included in a CTA”.
255 Supra note 128, allowing treaty benefits on the grounds that the Canadian GAAR did not apply
because it was not established that the transactions were contrary to the object and purpose of the
Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty. This case is discussed in the first part of this article.
256 Supra note 129, denying treaty benefits on the basis of an implicit anti-abuse principle. This case is
discussed in the first part of this article.
257 Supra, text accompanying notes 35-51 under the heading “Other Treaty Abuses”.
254
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requirements of relevant treaty provisions in a way that contradicts their objects
and purposes.258
As a result, even if a treaty does not include a specific anti-abuse provision
like article 14(1) of the MLI to address the tax-motivated splitting-up of contracts to
avoid permanent establishment status for a building site or construction or
installation project that lasts more than twelve months, the PPT could apply to deny
treaty benefits that would otherwise be denied under this rule where granting the
benefits would be contrary to the object and purpose of the provision to exclude
short-term building or construction or installation projects from source taxation of
business profits.259 Where a construction project that is expected to last 22 months
is divided into two different contracts, each lasting 11 months, for example, the
commentary concludes that granting the benefit of the exclusion from permanent
establishment status under article 5(3) of the OECD model convention “would be
contrary to the object and purpose” of this provision “as the time limitation … would
otherwise be meaningless.”260
Since the time limitation in this provision would also be meaningless if
separate contracts lasting less than 12 months could always be aggregated to deny
the exemption from permanent establishment status, it is clear that this conclusion
depends on the facts and circumstances of this example, according to which the bid
for the construction project is originally submitted by a company (RCO) resident in
As explained earlier, the relationship between the PPT and specific anti-abuse provisions that are
not included in a CTA is ultimately a matter of interpretation having regard to the relevant provisions
as well as extrinsic materials such as explanatory memoranda and commentaries that may shed light
on the intentions of the contracting jurisdictions. Supra text accompanying notes 84-100 under the
heading “Relevance of Specific Treaty Anti-Abuse Rules not Included in a CTA”.
259 Paragraph 52 of the commentary on article 5 of the OECD model convention.
260 Example J in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention
258
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State R to an independent company (SCO) resident in State, the contract is then split
during negotiations and separate contracts are concluded with RCO and “a recentlyincorporated wholly owned subsidiary of RCO” (SUBCO), and “the contractual
arrangements are such that RCO is jointly and several liable with SUBCO for the
performance of SUBCO’s contractual obligations under the SUBCO-SCO contract.”261
Consequently, as with the treaty shopping examples in which the commentary
concludes that the PPT would apply, the conclusion that the PPT should apply to this
contract-splitting case ultimately depends on the absence of any real economic
substance to the arrangement.
Similarly, although the commentary on the OECD model convention does not
explicitly state that the PPT can apply to deny benefits that would otherwise be
denied under a specific anti-abuse rule for dividend transfer transactions like article
8(1) of the MLI, this conclusion is suggested by the text and context of the MLI and
by an example in the commentary that considers the possible application of the PPT
to a transaction to which this specific anti-abuse provision could also apply.262 In this
example, a company (RCO) resident in State R that has held 24 percent of the shares
of another company (SCO) resident in State S, increases its shareholding to 25
percent following the entry-into-force of a tax treaty between States R and S in order
to obtain the reduced rate of withholding tax on dividends under article 10(2)(a) of
the OECD model convention.263 Without discussing the time period between the
increase in RCO’s shareholding and the receipt of a dividend from SCO, or

Ibid.
See the discussion at supra, text accompanying notes 88-93.
263 Example E in paragraph 182 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention
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considering the possible existence of a minimum shareholding period for the
reduced withholding tax rate on dividends, the commentary concludes that the PPT
“would not apply” deny the benefit of article 10(2)(a) because this provision “uses
an arbitrary threshold of 25 per cent for the purposes of determining which
shareholders are entitled to the benefit of the lower rate of tax on dividends.”264
While this statement seems to suggest that the minimum shareholding
threshold in article 10(2)(a) operates as a safe harbor, the commentary also states
that “granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the
object and purpose” of the provision because RCO “genuinely increases its
participation” in SCO in order to satisfy this requirement.265 As with the treaty
shopping examples in which the commentary concludes that the PPT would not
apply, therefore, the conclusion that the PPT would not apply in this circumstance
depends on an implicit economic substance criterion that distinguishes genuine
cross-border economic activities for which treaty benefits are properly granted from
tax-motivated transactions or arrangements with little or no economic substance for
which treaty benefits may be denied.
Although the commentary on the OECD model convention does not address
the possible application of the PPT to transactions or arrangements that avoid a
substituted property rule by diluting the value of shares or comparable interests
attributable to immovable property, it is arguable that the PPT could apply in these
circumstances even if the CTA does not include a specific anti-abuse provision like
article 9(1) of MLI which applies the value threshold for the substituted property
264
265

Ibid.
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rule “at any time during the 365 days preceding the alienation”.266 As well, the
commentary explicitly states that the PPT could apply to hiring-out of labour
arrangements even if a treaty does not include a specific anti-abuse rule to address
these arrangements.267 In each of these cases, application of the PPT would depend
on whether the transactions or arrangements contradict the object and purpose of
the relevant provisions: to “prevent non-taxation by the source state of capital gains
derived principally from immovable property situated in the source state” in the
case of the substituted property rule,268 and “to avoid the source taxation of shortterm employments to the extent that the employment income is not allowed as a
deductible expense in the State of source” in the case of article 15(2) of the OECD
model convention.269 As with the application of the PPT to other transactions or
arrangements, the presence or absence of real economic substance may well be
relevant to this inquiry.
(c)

Effect of Object and Purpose Test as an Exception
In the guiding principle and the Canadian GAAR, the object and purpose test

constitutes an additional requirement that must be satisfied in order to deny
benefits that would otherwise be available, imposing an onus on the revenue
department to establish that a benefit that a taxpayer would otherwise obtain is
contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions. In this context,
therefore, the object and purpose test requires the revenue department to “go
behind” the ordinary meaning of the relevant provisions in order to demonstrate
See the discussion at supra, text accompanying notes 98-100.
Paragraph 8.8 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model Convention.
268 Alta Energy, supra note 217 at para 41.
269 Paragraph 6.2 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention.
266
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why a benefit that would otherwise result from the ordinary meaning of these
provisions should be denied on the grounds that granting the benefit would
contradict their objects and purposes. 270 For this reason, Canadian courts have
generally held that the GAAR should apply only where the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions is “clear and unambiguous”.271
In the PPT, on the other hand, the object and purpose test is an exception that
allows a benefit that would otherwise be denied under the provision on the grounds
that one of the principal purposes of a transaction or arrangement was to obtain the
benefit. As a result, the PPT shifts the onus to the taxpayer to establish that a benefit
that would otherwise be denied should be allowed because it is in accordance with
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of a CTA. For this reason, the PPT
has been sharply criticized.272
Since the PPT applies only to benefits that would otherwise be granted under
the ordinary meaning of the relevant provisions, however, this onus should be easier
to establish than the onus on the revenue department under the guiding principle
See, e.g., Copthorne, supra note 107 at para. 66, stating that the Canadian GAAR is “a legal
mechanism whereby Parliament has conferred on the court the unusual duty of going behind the
words of the legislation to determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision or provisions relied
upon by the taxpayer”.
271 See, e.g., OSFC, supra note 189 at para. 69; Canada Trustco, supra note 70 at para. 50; and
Copthorne, supra note 107 at para. 68. This conclusion is consistent with the language of subsection
245(4) as it read at the time of the decision in OSFC which provided that the GAAR would not apply to
an avoidance transaction where it was reasonable to conclude that the transaction did not result in a
misuse or abuse, but is not consistent with the amended language of this provision which provides
that the GAAR applies to an avoidance transaction if it may reasonably be considered to result in a
misuse or abuse. See David G. Duff, “The Supreme Court of Canada and the General Anti-Avoidance
Rule” (2006), 60 Bulletin for International Taxation 54 at 67. Without specifically addressing this
issue, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Lipson, supra note 75 at para. 21, that the
Canadian GAAR imposes a burden on the revenue department “to prove, on the balance of
probabilities, that the avoidance transaction results in abuse and misuse within the meaning of s.
245(4)” [emphasis added].
272 See, e.g., De Broe and Luts, supra note 65 at 145, arguing that the burden of proof in the PPT is
“manifestly unbalanced.”
270
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and the Canadian GAAR, since it requires taxpayers only to demonstrate that the
objects and purposes of the relevant provisions are consistent with their ordinary
meaning, not incompatible with their ordinary meaning. As a result, even though the
PPT imposes a “reversed” onus on the taxpayer to establish that the granting of a
benefit is in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions, the
ultimate effect may not be very different from the guiding principle or the Canadian
GAAR, since it is reasonable to expect that the revenue department will still be
required to go behind the words of the relevant provisions to demonstrate why
granting the benefit under a CTA would be contrary to the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions.273
At the same time, since the object and purpose exception in the PPT applies
where “it is established” that granting a benefit would be in accordance with the
object and purpose of the relevant provisions, not where it is “reasonable to
conclude” or “clearly established” that granting a benefit would be in accordance
with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions, the applicable standard
appears to be on the balance of probabilities so that neither the taxpayer nor the
revenue department must “clearly and unambiguously” establish that granting a
benefit is either consistent with or contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant
provisions.274 In this respect, as with the purpose test, the PPT imposes a lower
burden on the revenue department than the guiding principle or the Canadian GAAR.

For a similar conclusion, see Lang, supra note 82 at 660, arguing that “[t]he fact that this criterion
was formulated as an exception is irrelevant.”
274 Chand takes a contrary view, relying on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canada Trustco,
supra note 70 at para 50, for the proposition that “the benefit of the doubt … shall go to the taxpayer.”
Chand, supra note 178 at 21. Notwithstanding the conclusion in Canada Trustco (which, as noted at
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(4)

Consequences of Application
Where a transaction or arrangement results directly or indirectly in a benefit

under a CTA, it is reasonable to conclude that one of the principal purposes of the
transaction or arrangement is to obtain the benefit, and it is not established that
granting the benefit is in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant
provisions of the CTA, the PPT provides that the benefit “shall not be granted”. In this
respect, the consequences of the PPT’s application are similar to those of the guiding
principle, which states that “the benefits of a double taxation convention should not
be available” where the principle applies.
Where the Canadian GAAR applies, on the other hand, the provision states
that “the tax consequences to a person shall be determined as is reasonable in the
circumstances in order to deny a tax benefit” that would otherwise result from the
transaction or series of transactions.275 As a result, unlike the PPT and the guiding
principle, the Canadian GAAR establishes an objective “reasonable in the
circumstances” standard for determining the tax consequences of its application, and
limits these tax consequences to those that are reasonable “in order to deny [the] tax
benefit”.276 Since the characterization of a tax benefit under the Canadian GAAR
generally depends on a comparison with the tax consequences resulting from an
alternative transaction or arrangement that “might reasonably have been carried out
but for the existence of the tax benefit,”277 moreover, the tax consequences that are
supra note 271, is itself inconsistent with the amended text of subsection 245(4) of the ITA), this
approach is not consistent with the text of the PPT.
275 ITA, s. 245(2).
276 Arnold and Wilson, supra note 142 at 1171-1172.
277 Copthorne Holdings, supra note 107 at para. 35, citing Duff, et. al, Canadian Income Tax Law, supra
note 107 at 187.
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“reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a tax benefit” generally
correspond to those that would have resulted under the alternative transaction or
arrangement. For this reason, the Canadian GAAR contains an implicit
recharacterization principle governing the tax consequences of its application.
In contrast, because the PPT states only that a benefit under a CTA “shall not
be granted” when the provision applies, the application of this provision could make
taxpayers worse off than they would have been under an alternative transaction or
arrangement that might reasonably have been carried out but for the existence of
the treaty benefit that is denied. For example, where an individual assigns the right
to receive dividends that have been declared but not paid to a company owning
more than the minimum shareholding that is required for the lower rate of
withholding tax on dividends payments from a subsidiary to a parent, the PPT could
deny the benefit of any withholding tax reduction under the CTA rather than the
benefit of the lower withholding tax rate. Likewise, where a taxpayer resident in one
state assigns the right to receive dividends, interest or royalties to a company
resident in a state that has a more advantageous tax treaty with the source state than
the state of which the taxpayer is a resident, the PPT could also apply to deny the
benefit of any withholding tax reduction, rather than the benefit of the reduced
withholding tax under the more advantageous tax treaty.
Although the PPT could recognize treaty benefits that would have been
obtained under an alternative transaction or arrangement if the meaning of “a
benefit under a Covered Tax Agreement” were understood by reference to the tax
consequences that would have resulted from this alternative transaction or
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arrangement, this interpretation is less persuasive than the more obvious
interpretation of this term which compares the tax consequences of the transaction
or arrangement to the tax consequences that would have resulted under the
domestic law of a contracting jurisdiction absent the CTA.278 Nor does the PPT itself
authorize the recharacterization of a transaction or arrangement in order to
recognize alternative treaty benefits, though more than one commentator have
correctly observed that the PPT would not apply to a suitably recharacterized
transaction or arrangement if such recharacterization were available under
domestic law.279
Instead, the MLI contains a remedial benefits rule authorizing the competent
authority of the contracting jurisdiction that would have granted a treaty benefit but
for the PPT to:
… nevertheless treat that person as being entitled to this benefit, or to different
benefits with respect to a specific item of income or capital, if such competent
authority, upon request from that person and after consideration of the relevant facts
and circumstances, determines that such benefits would have been granted to that
person in the absence of the transaction or arrangement.280

Of eighty-four jurisdictions that had signed the MLI as of 18 September 2018,
however, only twenty-eight (not including Canada) had adopted this provision.281

See the discussion at supra text accompanying notes 106-110.
See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 51, arguing the PPT would not apply where “treaty benefits are
granted on a recharacterized fact pattern”; and Chand, supra note 178 at 40, concluding that
alternative treaty benefits may be granted “if such benefits are available under domestic law
mechanisms.”
280 Article 7(4) of the MLI. In this circumstance, the provision continues: “The competent authority of
the Contracting Jurisdiction to which a request has been made under this paragraph by a resident of
the other Contracting Jurisdiction shall consult with the competent authority of that other Contracting
Jurisdiction before rejecting the request.”
281 Figures compiled by the author from positions of signatories available at OECD, “Signatories and
Parties to the Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Measures to Prevent Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting: Status as of 18 September 2018” supra note 33.
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As the commentary on the OECD model convention explains, this provision is
intended to allow the competent authority of a Contracting State to “have the
possibility” of treating a person who is denied a benefit under the PPT “as being
entitled to this benefit, or to different benefits with respect to the relevant item of
income or capital, if such benefits would have been granted to that person in the
absence of the transaction or arrangement” that triggered application of the PPT.282
For example, the commentary explains, where an individual who is resident in State
R and owns shares of SCo, which is resident in State S, assigns the right to receive
dividends declared by SCo to another company resident in State R which owns more
than 10 percent of the capital of the paying company for the principal purpose of
obtaining a reduced rate of withholding tax under article 10(2)(a) of the treaty, and
the PPT applies, this provision would:
… allow the competent authority of State S to grant the benefit of the reduced rate
provided for in subparagraph b) of paragraph 2 of Article 10 if that competent
authority determined that such benefit would have been granted in the absence of
the assignment to another company of the right to receive dividends.283

Although this provision allows for the possibility of remedial benefits, it is
poorly drafted since it limits these benefits to those that would have been granted to
the same person (“that person”) in the absence of the transaction or arrangement. As
the above example indicates, however, the alternative treaty benefits might have
been granted to a different person than the person whose treaty benefits are denied
Paragraph 184 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention. See also ibid. at
paragraph 185, emphasizing that the provision grants broad discretion to the competent authority to
which the request is made to determine whether a benefit would have been granted in the absence of
an arrangement or transaction subject to the PPT, but also noting that the provision requires the
competent authority to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances before reaching a decision
and requires the competent authority to consult with the competent authority of the other
Contracting State before rejecting a request brought by a resident of the other Contracting State.
283 Paragraph 186 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
282
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under the PPT. For this reason, it would have been preferable to provide for
alternative benefits to be granted if the competent authority determines that such
benefits “would have been granted in the absence of the transaction or arrangement”
regardless of the person to whom they would have been granted.284
More generally, this provision is also deficient because it leaves the decision
to grant alternative benefits to the discretion of the competent authority of the
contracting jurisdiction that would have granted a treaty benefit but for the PPT,
subject only to the requirement that it consult the competent authority of the other
contracting jurisdiction before rejecting a request for such benefits. Instead, as at
least one commentator has suggested, the right to alternative benefits should be
automatic,285 and any penalty associated with application of the PPT should be
levied explicitly rather than implicitly through the denial of other treaty benefits that
would otherwise have been available.
Finally, it is unfortunate that neither the MLI nor the OECD model convention
nor the commentary on the OECD model convention address the consequences in
the other contracting jurisdiction where one contracting jurisdiction applies the PPT
to deny benefits that would otherwise have been available under the CTA.286 Since
the elimination of double taxation article in a CTA obliges the state of residence to
allow a credit for income tax paid in the source state where this income is taxed “in
accordance with the provisions” of the CTA, the denial of treaty benefits by the
source state should create a corresponding obligation on the residence state to

Danon, supra note 69 at 52.
Ibid.
286 For a useful discussion of possible challenges, see Lang, supra note 82 at 662-663.
284
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credit the increased tax that must be paid in the source state. The extent of this
obligation, however, will presumably depend on whether the source state applies
the PPT to deny all treaty benefits or grants treaty benefits that would have been
granted in the absence of the transaction or arrangement. Where the contracting
jurisdictions disagree about application of the PPT or the appropriate consequences,
double taxation is likely and resort to the mutual agreement procedure may be the
only alternative.287
Conclusion
Although based on the OECD’s guiding principle and similar in structure to
many domestic GAARs including the Canadian GAAR, the PPT represents a
significant development in international tax law, adding a general anti-abuse
provision to all CTAs as well as other tax treaties that follow the 2017 OECD model
convention. As with the introduction of domestic GAARs, the PPT will pose new
challenges for tax practitioners, revenue authorities and adjudicators, since treaty
benefits that would previously have resulted from tax-motivated transactions or
arrangements may now be denied under the PPT. These challenges may be
compounded to the extent that the PPT will apply to multiple tax treaties among
many jurisdictions, which may not adopt similar approaches to tax treaty
interpretation generally or the PPT in particular.288 As a result, over the short run at

Taboada, supra note 142 at 606.
For a pessimistic assessment, see Philip Baker, “The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” [2017] Brit. Tax Rev. 281 at 283,
concluding that: “There is every reason to fear that, once the MLI is in force and a large number of
countries (including ones with tax authorities that do not have a reputation for predictable
interpretation of tax treaties) begin to apply the PPT, this will undermine the whole system of tax
treaty benefits.”
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least, the PPT can be expected to increase uncertainty in international tax planning
and lead to an increased number of tax treaty disputes289 – a result that the OECD
itself anticipates in also seeking to make dispute resolution mechanisms more
effective through BEPS Action 14.290
At the same time, it is important to recognize that pre-BEPS responses to tax
treaty shopping and other perceived tax treaty abuses have themselves been varied
and inconsistently applied, and that the PPT is intended not only to intended to both
strengthen treaty-based responses to perceived tax treaty abuses but also to
promote greater consistency in these responses through a single anti-abuse
provision which all signatories to the MLI have chosen to adopt in order to satisfy
the OECD’s minimum standards on tax treaty abuse under BEPS Action 6. If this
objective of increased consistency is to be realized, however, it is important that tax
practitioners, revenue authorities and adjudicators understand why the PPT was
adopted, how it relates to other anti-avoidance doctrines, principles and rules, the
requirements for and consequences of its application, and the kinds of transactions
or arrangements to which it may reasonably be expected to apply. It is to this end
that this article is directed.
Briefly recapping, the first part of this article surveyed pre-BEPS responses to
tax treaty shopping and other perceived tax treaty abuses, providing necessary
background and context for understanding BEPS Action 4, the MLI, the PPT, and the
kinds of transactions or arrangements to which the PPT can be expected to apply.

See, e.g., Danon, supra note 69 at 32; and Kużniacki, supra note 120 at 32.
OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, BEPS Action 14: 2015 Final Report,
(Paris: OECD, 2015).
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Building on this analysis, the second part of the article has examined the PPT in the
context of BEPS Action 4 and other provisions of the MLI, considering the
relationship between this general anti-abuse provision and other anti-avoidance
doctrines, principles and rules, and the various elements that comprise its basic
structure including the various tests that must be satisfied for the provision to apply
as well as the consequences of its application.
With respect to other anti-avoidance doctrines, principles and rules, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the PPT will, where applicable, displace the “guiding
principle” in the commentary on the OECD model convention,291 but not domestic
anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory anti-avoidance rules, which should be
considered prior to the PPT since these doctrines and rules generally determine the
characterization of transactions or arrangements to which tax treaty apply.292 In this
respect, as with treaty-based SAARs, the PPT is properly regarded as a provision of
“last resort” that should not be used to augment the tax consequences resulting from
the application of other anti-avoidance doctrines or rules.293 Where a treaty-based
SAAR does not apply to a transaction or arrangement, on the other hand, the PPT
may apply if the transaction or arrangement circumvents the SAAR in a manner that
contradicts its underlying object and purpose.294 Likewise, it appears as though the
PPT may also apply to transactions or arrangements that would otherwise be subject

Supra text accompanying notes 66-69 under the heading “Relationship to Implicit Anti-Abuse
Principle”.
292 Supra text accompanying notes 57-65 under the heading “Relationship to Domestic AntiAvoidance Doctrines and Statutory Anti-Avoidance Rules”.
293 Supra text accompanying notes 70-75 under the heading “Relationship to Specific Treaty AntiAbuse Rules in a CTA”.
294 Supra text accompanying notes 76-83 under the heading “Relationship to Specific Treaty AntiAbuse Rules in a CTA”.
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to treaty-based SAARs that do not modify a particular CTA or are not otherwise
included in the CTA.295
Regarding the structure of the PPT itself, application of this provision turns
on the satisfaction of three tests: (1) a result test, which requires that a transaction
or arrangement has resulted directly or indirectly in a benefit under a CTA; (2) a
purpose test that applies where it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all the
relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining the benefit was one of the principal
purposes of the transaction or arrangement; and (3) an object and purpose test that
excludes transactions or arrangements from application of the PPT where it is
established that granting the benefit would be in accordance with the object and
purpose of the relevant provisions of the CTA. Where the first two tests are satisfied
and the third is not, the PPT denies the benefit that would otherwise be granted
under the CTA.
The result test requires a connection or nexus between the transaction or
arrangement and the benefit, which may be easily established where a single
transaction results in a benefit, but could be more difficult to identify where a benefit
results indirectly from another transaction or arrangement or from several
transactions that may or may not comprise an arrangement for the purposes of the
PPT. However, since the concept of an arrangement may be broadly understood to
include an extended series of transactions, and the PPT clearly applies where
benefits are obtained indirectly as well as directly, this test is likely to be easily

Supra text accompanying notes 84-100 under the heading “Relationship to Specific Treaty AntiAbuse Rules not Included in a CTA”.
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satisfied.296 Unlike the Canadian GAAR, for which the concept of a tax benefit may be
interpreted by reference to a benchmark transaction that might reasonably have
been carried out but for the existence of the tax benefit, the most reasonable
interpretation of a benefit under a CTA relates to the tax consequences that would
have resulted under the domestic law of the relevant contracting jurisdiction absent
the CTA.297
The purpose test requires an objective assessment of the principal purposes
of the transaction or arrangement in order to determine whether one of these
purposes was to obtain a benefit under a CTA.298 Interpreting similar language in the
context of domestic tax provisions, U.K. decisions have held that a principal purpose
“has a connotation of importance”299 and that a principal purpose of a transaction
may be to obtain a tax advantage even if the transaction had a commercial objective
at least as important as the tax advantage.300 As a result, the threshold for this
purpose test is lower than the threshold in most domestic GAARs which generally
apply only where the sole or dominant purpose of a transaction or arrangement is to
obtain a tax benefit, and lower than the threshold in the Canadian GAAR which
applies where a transaction or arrangement is undertaken primarily to obtain a tax
benefit.301 Since the purposes test applies where it is “reasonable to conclude” that
one of the principal purposes of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain a benefit, it
Supra text accompanying notes 117-134 under the headings “Transaction or Arrangement” and
“Benefit Results Directly or Indirectly from the Transaction or Arrangement”.
297 Supra text accompanying notes 101-116 under the heading “Benefit under a CTA”.
298 Supra text accompanying notes 139-152 under the heading “Purpose of a Transaction or
Arrangement” and notes 187-193 under the heading “Reasonableness of Conclusion”.
299 Travel Document Service, supra note 167 at para. 48.
300 Lloyds TSB Equipment Leasing (TCC), supra note 168 at para. 82.
301 Supra text accompanying notes 153-181 under the heading “One of the Principal Purposes of a
Transaction or Arrangement”.
296
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also imposes a relatively low burden on the revenue authority, effectively requiring
taxpayers to argue that it would be unreasonable to conclude that a principal
purpose of a transaction or arrangement was to obtain a benefit under a CTA.302 As a
result, the purpose test in the PPT may also be easy to satisfy, as a result of which
application of the provision will turn primarily on whether granting the benefit
would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the
CTA.303
The object and purpose test requires an assessment of the “relevant
provisions” of the CTA as well as their underlying objects and purposes, in order to
determine whether granting a treaty benefit in the circumstances would be in
accordance with these objects and purposes. In addition to the specific provision
that is relied upon to obtain the benefit, relevant provisions include other provisions
that are circumvented by the transaction or arrangement, as well as provisions of the
CTA (including the preamble) read as a whole – which reflect the objects and
purposes of the CTA more generally.304 Since contracting jurisdictions to the MLI are
required to adopt the amended preamble language in article 6(1) in order to
implement the minimum standard on BEPS Action 6, this amended preamble
language will be particularly relevant to cases of tax treaty shopping. 305 Other
relevant provisions may include provisions of the MLI of model treaties that are not
included in the particular CTA – though the relevance of these provisions will
presumably depend on extrinsic evidence of whether the parties intended to permit
Supra text accompanying notes 194-195 under the heading “Reasonableness of Conclusion”.
Supra text accompanying note 196 under the heading “Reasonableness of Conclusion”.
304 Supra text accompanying notes 201-208 under the heading “Relevant Provisions”.
305 Supra text accompanying note 205 under the heading “Relevant Provisions”.
302
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transactions or arrangements that might otherwise be prohibited by these
provisions or intended to rely on the more general language of the PPT to challenge
these transactions or arrangements without adopting the detailed limitation of these
SAARs.306
Unlike ordinary interpretation, in which the object and purpose of a
provision is relied upon in order to interpret its ordinary meaning, the object and
purpose test in the PPT looks to the rationale that underlies the words of the
provision or the treaty as a whole, which may not be fully expressed by the words
themselves.307 Although these objects and purposes may be inferred from the text of
the relevant provision, they may also be explained in extrinsic materials like the
commentary on the OECD model convention, or construed in light of the more
general objects and purposes of the CTA as a whole. 308 Once the objects and
purposes of the relevant provisions are determined, a second stage of the object and
purpose analysis involves a factual assessment of the transaction or arrangement at
issue to determine whether granting a benefit is in accordance with these objects
and purposes.309 Statements and examples in the commentary on the OECD model
convention suggest that this will generally be the case for transactions or
arrangements involving genuine cross-border economic activities, but not for
transactions or arrangements with little or no real economic substance.310

Supra text accompanying notes 209-211 under the heading “Relevant Provisions”.
Supra text accompanying note 213 under the heading “Treaty Benefit in Accordance with Object
and Purpose of Relevant Provisions”.
308 Supra text accompanying notes 215-225 under the heading “Interpreting the Object and Purpose
of a Treaty Provision”.
309 Supra note 212 and accompanying text.
310 Supra text accompanying notes 182-1867 under the heading “One of the Principal Purposes of a
Transaction or Arrangement” and notes 226-268 under the heading “Assessing the Facts”.
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In contrast to the object and purpose tests in the guiding principle and the
Canadian GAAR, which operate as additional requirements that must be satisfied in
order to deny benefits that would otherwise be available under an ordinary
interpretation of the relevant provisions, the object and purpose test in the PPT is an
exception to the general anti-abuse provision that allows benefits that would
otherwise be denied where it is established that granting the benefit would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions. Although this
shifts the onus from the revenue authorities to the taxpayer, the ultimate effect may
be negligible since the guiding principle and the Canadian GAAR require the revenue
authorities to go behind the words of the relevant provisions to demonstrate that
granting a benefit would be contrary to the objects and purposes of these provisions,
while the PPT requires taxpayers to argue only that granting a benefit that would
otherwise be available under the ordinary interpretation of the relevant provisions
is also consistent with their underlying objects and purposes – which shifts the onus
back to the revenue authorities to establish that granting the benefit would be
contrary to the objects and purposes of these provisions.311
Finally, since the PPT states only that a benefit under a CTA “shall not be
granted” if the provision applies, it seems likely that the provision could have
punitive consequences – denying not only a treaty benefit that would have resulted
from the transaction or arrangement at issue but also other treaty benefits that
would have resulted under an alternative transaction or arrangement that might

Supra text accompanying note 272 under the heading “Effect of Object and Purpose Test as an
Exception”.
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otherwise have been carried out. 312 Although the MLI includes a provision
authorizing the competent authority of the contracting jurisdiction that would have
granted treaty benefits but for the PPT to grant remedial benefits to a person if it
determines that these benefits would have been granted to that person in the
absence of the transaction or arrangement at issue, this provision is deficient since it
limits these benefits to those that would have been granted to the same person in the
absence of the transaction or arrangement, depends discretion of the competent
authority of the contracting jurisdiction that would otherwise have granted the
benefit, and does not address the obligations of a residence states to make
adjustments consequential on application of the PPT by a source state.313 Aside from
these deficiencies, it is unfortunate that of eight-four signatories to the MLI as of 18
September 2018 only twenty-eight (not including Canada) indicated that they would
adopt this remedial benefits provision.314 Although this may suggest that contracting
jurisdictions intend that the PPT should have punitive consequences, it may also be
the case that contracting jurisdictions have not fully considered the potential
consequences of the PPT’s application. Indeed, if these punitive consequences make
revenue authorities and adjudicators reluctant to apply the PPT in the first place,
failure to adopt the remedial benefits provision may undermine the potential role of
the PPT.

Supra text accompanying notes 273-277 under the heading “Consequences of Application”.
Supra text accompanying notes 278-285 under the heading “Consequences of Application”
314 Figures compiled by the author from positions of signatories available at OECD, “Signatories and
Parties to the Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Measures to Prevent Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting: Status as of 18 September 2018” supra note 33.
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